Feb 26, 2012 | Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized
This recent SC Court of Appeals case dealt with the extent of liability against landowners whose farm animals stray off property. Both SC and NC are largely agricultural states with all types of livestock – cows, horses, pigs, goats, sheep, etc. A farmer has an affirmative duty to take steps to keep their livestock secure through fencing and other means to protect their neighbor’s property. If the livestock “get loose” and cause damage, the owner is strictly liable for the harm. This case considered whether that same liability extended to drivers who might strike wandering animals on public roadways. The Court determined that such strict liability did not apply here. Rather, the individual case would have to be reviewed for driver negligence. The typical defenses asserted are that the driver should have been going at a proper speed which would allow him to take evasive action and/or stop before striking animals on the roadway, similar to any other objects or “debris.” Of course, passengers in these vehicle accidents would not be subject to this analysis and would be entitled to damages for any injuries sustained. In addition to farm animals, we see alot of cases where drivers strike wild deer on the road. Sadly, such impacts can cause tremendous damage and even cause the driver to lose control and crash. When driving, especially at night, on rural roads, keep your speed slower so that you can hopefully anticipate and avoid these risks. Be Safe. Get Home.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the potential criminal, insurance, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We would welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Pearl C. Williams, Appellant,
v.
Dean Smalls, Respondent.
Appeal From Marion County
Michael G. Nettles, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 4755
Submitted May 3, 2010 – Filed October 20, 2010
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Michael T. Miller, of Florence, for Appellant
R. Hawthorne Barrett, of Columbia, and R. Heath Atkinson, of Florence, for Respondent.
THOMAS, J.: Pearl C. Williams appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment which held section 47-7-130 of the South Carolina Code (1987) did not impose strict liability on the owner of livestock for personal injuries suffered when Williams’s automobile collided with escaped cows. We affirm as modified.
FACTS
In January 2006, Pearl Williams was traveling along U.S. Highway 76 in Marion County, when her automobile collided with cows owned by Dean Smalls, causing Williams personal injury.
Williams sued Smalls alleging both negligence and, pursuant to section 47-7-130, strict liability. Smalls moved for summary judgment, and Williams conceded summary judgment on the negligence claim. The trial court subsequently heard the motion on the strict liability claim and granted summary judgment, finding section 47-7-130 extended only to real property damage and not personal injury. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court may grant a motion for summary judgment when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), SCRCP. However, “[d]etermining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this [c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo.” Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008); see also Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. State, 372 S.C. 519, 524, 642 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2007).
LAW/ANALYSIS
The trial court held there was no support for the position that the damages recoverable under section 47-7-130 extended to personal injury. Accordingly, the trial court held that recovery for personal injury resulting under these facts required a showing of negligence and therefore granted summary judgment. We agree, in part.
This case involves two novel questions of law: first, whether section 47-7-130 imposes a strict liability standard on the owners of livestock for personal injury, and second, if such a standard is imposed, whether it extends to personal injury occasioned when livestock is found at large upon a public roadway.
Section 47-7-130 of the South Carolina Code provides:
Whenever any domestic animals shall be found upon the lands of any other person than the owner or manager of such animals, the owner of such trespassing stock shall be liable for all damages sustained and for the expenses of seizure and maintenance. Such damages and expenses shall be recovered, when necessary, by action in any court of competent jurisdiction. And the trespassing stock shall be held liable for such damages and expenses, in preference to all other liens, claims or encumbrances upon it.
When this court is confronted with construing a statute:
[If] the statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a definite meaning, the rules of statutory construction are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning. What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature.
Hardee v. McDowell, 381 S.C. 445, 453, 673 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Initially, the plain language of section 47-7-130 imposes strict liability for “all damages.” S.C. Code Ann. § 47-7-130 (emphasis added). We find the plain meaning of the language “all damages” contemplates not only injury to real property, but also personal property. See Kirby v. Mathis, 89 S.C. 252, 71 S.E. 862 (1911) (imposing strict liability on the owner of trespassing stock for damage done to plaintiff’s wheat crop); Restatement (Third) Torts: Liab. Physical Harm § 21 (2005) (recognizing the tendency of wandering animals to not only injure real property, but also to damage structures and other personal property unaffixed to the land, such as: harvested crops, livestock, and feed supplies); Vangilder v. Faulk, 426 S.W.2d 821 (Ark. 1968) (recognizing the owner of a trespassing bull to be liable for damage caused when the bull attacked the plaintiff’s livestock); Hart v. Meredith, 553 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (recognizing liability on the owner of a trespassing bull for impregnating plaintiff’s cow); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 560 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the liability of the owner of trespassing stock for infecting plaintiff’s animals with disease). Additionally, this plain reading contemplates strict liability for personal injury. See Robinson v. Kerr, 355 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1960) (finding strict liability for personal injury caused by livestock while plaintiff was attempting to expel the trespassing stock); Nixion v. Harris, 238 N.E.2d 785 (Ohio 1968) (imposing strict liability for personal injury caused by trespassing livestock); Williams v. River Lakes Ranch Development Corp., 116 Cal.Rptr. 200 (Ct. App. 1974) (imposing strict liability on the owner of a bull when the bull trespassed on neighboring property and gored the owner).
However, just as the plain language of section 47-7-130 imposes strict liability for “all damages,” the title of the statute directly and specifically addresses the “liability of owners of trespassing stock.” See S.C. Code Ann. § 47-7-130 (emphasis added). In the general sense, a trespass is an intentional tort in which a trespasser invades a plaintiff’s interest in the exclusive possession of his real property. See, e.g., Cedar Cove Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 264, 628 S.E.2d 284, 289 (Ct. App. 2006) (Anderson, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the language of section 47-7-130 is not as explicit in regards to when strict liability is appropriate as it is about what damages an owner shall be strictly liable for. Consequently, we must look beyond the language of the statute to determine if strict liability applies only when the damage is a result of a trespass.
Traditionally, the common law did not, and in the absence of a statute to the contrary does not, impose a strict duty to keep one’s stock from entering public highways or roadways unless the animal has reasonably known dangerous propensities. See Gibbs. v. Jackson, 990 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. 1999) (indicating that at the common law, although the owner of stock had a duty to prevent the animal from trespassing upon another person’s land, he had no duty to prevent the animal from straying onto a public roadway unless the owner had prior knowledge that the particular animal had dangerous propensities) (citing Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 430, 438-39 (Eng. C.P. 1863); Heath’s Garage, Ltd. v. Hodges, [1916] 2 K.B. 370, 375-84 (Eng. C.A.); Salmond, Salmond on Torts § 127, at 494, 500 (W.T.S. Stallybrass, ed. 7th ed. 1928)). In the absence of this strict duty, the preferred standard is negligence. See Restatement (Third) Torts: Liab. Physical Harm § 21 (noting that traditionally when stock strays onto highways, liability should rest only on a negligence standard and distinguishing between stock trespassing on private land, where the stock is the sole active entry and incidents on highways which must involve at least two actors).
The very essence of trespass, as a cause of action, is to ensure protection of an individual’s rights and interests in real property, not the least of which is the right of exclusion. In the simplest sense, these rights which support the imposition of strict liability are not implicated in situations in which stock enter upon public highways or roadways, and consequently, it seems universally accepted that liability in these circumstances shall be found only upon a showing of negligence. See Toole v. DuPuis, 735 So.2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (specifically considering and rejecting the application of strict liability to the owner of stock straying onto highways); Hand v. Starr, 550 N.W.2d 646 (Neb. 1996) (indicating a standard of strict liability for trespassing stock and negligence for stock entering public highways); Byram v. Main, 523 A.2d 1387 (Me. 1987) (finding an owner’s liability for stock straying onto highways shall be based upon negligence, not strict liability); Davert v. Larson, 209 Cal.Rptr. 445 (Ct. App. 1985) (indicating that the appropriate standard for trespassing stock is strict liability, but the standard for stock entering public highways is a negligence standard); Vaclavicek v. Olejarz, 297 A.2d 3 (N.J. 1972) (declining to apply strict liability to owners of stock entering public highways); Scanlan v. Smith, 404 P.2d 776 (Wash. 1965) (ruling negligence is the applicable standard for stock straying upon highways).
In this case, because Smalls’s cows strayed onto a public highway and not Williams’s private land, no property right of Williams’s was impinged solely by the cows’ presence upon the highway. Similarly, Williams enjoys neither the right of exclusive possession nor the right to expel other persons or property from the highway. Consequently, the historic justifications for the imposition of strict liability upon the owner of stock are not at stake here. Williams is entitled to no expectation that the roadways will be free and clear of all hazards, simply those hazards interposed by the unreasonable conduct of others. Likewise, a collision would require conduct on the part of Williams beyond merely the intrusion by the stock, which is not a risk common to trespassing stock. Therefore, we must find strict liability is not to be imposed when stock strays onto a highway or roadway. Rather, liability shall be found only upon negligence.
This holding aligns with the jurisprudence of this State which has recognized the imposition of a duty upon stock owners not to willfully or negligently permit animals to run at large. See S.C. Code Ann. § 47-7-110 (1987) (stating it shall be unlawful to willfully or negligently allow stock to run at large). Similarly, the courts of this State have suggested that liability for collisions with stock wandering into a highway rests on a negligence theory. Swindler v. Peay, 227 S.C. 157, 161, 87 S.E.2d 296, 299 (1955) (finding in a case in which a driver collided with livestock it was not error to suggest the predecessor of section 47-7-110 stated a duty on the part of the owner of the escaped stock); see also Reed v. Clark, 277 S.C. 310, 314, 286 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1982); McCullough v. Gatch, 251 S.C. 171, 175, 161 S.E.2d 182, 183-84 (1968) (both applying a negligence standard under the predecessor of section 47-7-130 in cases where a car collided with stock in the highway).
Recognizing the applicable standard of liability in this case is negligence, we find no error on the part of the trial court. Significantly, because Williams conceded any issues of negligence in this case we are not occasioned to consider what conduct will sufficiently support such a claim. It suffices that because our supreme court has held the duty imposed by section 47-7-110 to not willfully or negligently allow stock to run at large will not support negligence per se, a plaintiff must provide evidence of negligence in order to overcome summary judgment. See McCullough, 251 S.C. 171, 161 S.E.2d 182 (finding a plaintiff who collided with stock must present evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant).
CONCLUSION
We find section 47-7-130 imposes strict liability for personal injury caused by trespassing stock; however, we also find that negligence, not strict liability, is the appropriate standard for instances in which livestock wander into a highway. Accordingly, because we can affirm for any reason appearing in the record,[1] the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for failure to provide evidence of negligence is
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
FEW, C.J. and PIEPER, J., concur.
[1] See I’On v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (noting that an appellate court can affirm the trial court for any reason appearing in the record).
Feb 25, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized
This recent SC Supreme Court case discusses whether a city or municipality can basically exempt itself from a State law. In this matter, the issue is helmet laws for motorcyclists. Regardless of the outcome of this decision, it raises the controversial topic of whether motorcycle riders should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to wear protective helmets. We all know the safety issues and injury concerns. However, most motorcycle riders are fiercely independent thinkers and want to experience the freedom that only riding a motorcycle on an open road provides. It is an even more intimate experience with the road than riding in a convertible. We support a rider’s choice. While we know the potential consequences and represent injured parties in motorcycle accident cases, we still believe in the individual and our right to be free.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they collectively understand the potential criminal, insurance, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
George Jensen Aakjer, III,
Leight Andersen, Bobby
Wayne Archer, Donald Lee
Ard, Gary Philip Balcom,
Thurman Odell Barnes, Ralph
Hillary Bell, Jr., Marvin Simon
Beverly, Steven M. Brinsfield,
Laurie Ann Dzerwieniec,
Jeffery Jay Galbrath, Ronald
Dewayne Gause, Gwendolyn
Marie Harvey, Jessica Jane
Hayes, Anthony Odell Hyman,
Molly Infield, Mark Dale
Infield, Bonnie Roberts
Johnson, Emmett Earl Jones,
Dawn Michell Kelly, Richard
Allen Lester, Rodney Alan
Louhoff, Gary Edward Matson,
Carla Williams Mercer,
Richard O’Neil Mercer, Edward
Dee Mitchum, Kathy Mitchum,
Carol Justice North, Carol
O’Day, William O’Day, III,
Paul David Pinette, Steve
Pinnell, Robert George Pinto,
Debra A. Purcell, Rhonda
Delette Robinson, Scott Allen
Robinson, Rebecca Ann
Rowan, Scott Rowan, Joseph
Fred Ruddock, Jr., David
Francis Speck, Anita Lynn
Teachey, Robert Larry
Thompson, Waddell H.
Thompson, Michael James
Timm, Debbie Timm, Rebel
JM Tyler, Janice Waites, Susan
Wall, and Edward Lucas Williams, Petitioners,
v.
City of Myrtle Beach, City of Myrtle Beach Municipal Court, Respondents.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Opinion No. 26825
Heard February 3, 2010 – Filed June 8, 2010
JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONERS
Desa Ballard, of West Columbia, and James Thomas McGrath, of Richmond, Virginia, for Petitioners.
Michael W. Battle, of Battle, Vaught & Howe, of Conway, for Respondents.
JUSTICE PLEICONES: In response to various concerns stemming from motorcycle rallies, the City of Myrtle Beach enacted a number of ordinances and amendments to ordinances (the Motorcycle Ordinances). Among the ordinances was Ordinance 2008-64, which required that any person riding a motorcycle wear a protective helmet and eyewear (the Helmet Ordinance). Petitioners were each cited for violating the Helmet Ordinance by failing to wear the requisite helmet and eyewear. They brought this action in this Court’s original jurisdiction challenging the Helmet Ordinance on three points: (1) the Helmet Ordinance is preempted by State law; (2) the ordinance establishing the system for adjudicating infractions of the Helmet Ordinance, which has since been repealed, was so intertwined with certain Motorcycle Ordinances that its repeal caused the ordinances to fail[1]; and, (3) the current system for adjudicating alleged violations of the Helmet Ordinance in municipal court is improper as the municipal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the charges.
Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment finding the Helmet Ordinance and Motorcycle Ordinances invalid and a writ of prohibition barring the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the alleged violations of the Helmet Ordinance. We find: (1) that the Helmet Ordinance is preempted under the doctrine of implied field preemption; (2) that the Motorcycle Ordinances were impliedly repealed by the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system; and, (3) since we invalidate the Helmet Ordinance, we do not reach Petitioners’ argument seeking a writ of prohibition.
FACTS
For years, large motorcycle rallies were held in Myrtle Beach. A number of objections were had to the rallies based on, among other things, loud noise and rowdy behavior. Additionally, there was evidence the rallies placed a heavy burden on the local medical community, police, and other emergency responders.
In response, the City passed a number of ordinances and amendments dealing with rallies and motorcycles. Included among them was the Helmet Ordinance, an ordinance requiring all persons riding on motorcycles to wear approved helmets and eyewear. Under the language of the Helmet Ordinance, a violation was deemed an “administrative infraction.” The City passed an ordinance establishing an administrative hearing system to conduct hearings on citations charging violations of certain municipal ordinances, including certain Motorcycle Ordinances. The administrative hearing ordinance was subsequently repealed.
Petitioners were each cited for failing to wear the requisite helmet and eyewear in the City. After the administrative hearing system was repealed, the City issued a Uniform Ordinance Summons for each person charged, requiring them to appear before a municipal court judge. This Court accepted Petitioners’ petition for certiorari in its original jurisdiction before any charges were adjudicated.
ISSUES
| I. |
Is the Myrtle Beach Helmet Ordinance preempted by State law? |
| II. |
Are the Motorcycle Ordinances impliedly repealed? |
DISCUSSION
I. Preemption
A municipal ordinance is a legislative enactment and is presumed to be constitutional. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 497, 331 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1985). The burden of proving the invalidity of a municipal ordinance is on the party attacking it. Id. This State’s constitution provides that the powers of local governments should be liberally construed. See S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 17.
To determine the validity of a local ordinance, this Court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) did the local government have the power to enact the local ordinance, and if so (2) is the ordinance consistent with the constitution and general law of this State. See Beachfront Entertainment, Inc., v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, 379 S.C. 602, 605, 666 S.E.2d 912, 913 (2008). Petitioners advance a number of grounds for preemption of the Helmet Ordinance. We hold that the Helmet Ordinance fails under the doctrine of implied field preemption.
An ordinance is preempted under implied field preemption when the state statutory scheme so thoroughly and pervasively covers the subject as to occupy the field or when the subject mandates statewide uniformity. See South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Jasper County, 368 S.C. 388, 397, 629 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2006). The General Assembly addressed motorcycle helmet and eyewear requirements in S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-5-3660 and 56-5-3670 (2009), respectively. The statutes generally require all riders under age twenty-one to wear a protective helmet and utilize protective goggles or a face shield. The Helmet Ordinance, in contrast, requires all riders, regardless of age, to wear a helmet and eyewear.
In S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-30 (2009) the General Assembly authorized local authorities to act in the field of traffic regulation if the ordinance does not conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Traffic Act. Even assuming, as the City contends, that the Helmet Ordinance does not conflict with the Uniform Traffic Act, we find that the ordinance may not stand as the need for uniformity is plainly evident in the regulation of motorcycle helmets and eyewear. Were local authorities allowed to enforce individual helmet ordinances, riders would need to familiarize themselves with the various ordinances in advance of a trip, so as to ensure compliance. Riders opting not to wear helmets or eyewear in other areas of the state would be obliged to carry the equipment with them if they intended to pass through a city with a helmet ordinance. Moreover, local authorities might enact ordinances imposing additional and even conflicting equipment requirements. Such burdens would unduly limit a citizen’s freedom of movement throughout the State. Consequently, the Helmet Ordinance must fail under the doctrine of implied preemption.[2]
II. Implied Repeal
As noted above, the City initially sought to enforce the Motorcycle Ordinances, including the Helmet Ordinance, in an administrative hearing tribunal, but later repealed the ordinance establishing the system. Petitioners contend the City’s enactment of the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system caused the entire Motorcycle Ordinance scheme to fail.[3] We agree.
In general, repeal by implication is disfavored, and is found only when two statutes are incapable of any reasonable reconcilement. See Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Const. Co., Inc., 368 S.C. 137, 141, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41 (2006). “The repugnancy must be plain, and if the two provisions can be construed so that both can stand, a court shall so construe them.” Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 386 S.C. 357, 372, 688 S.E.2d 844, 852 (2010). When two statutes “are incapable of reasonable reconcilement, the last statute passed will prevail, so as to impliedly repeal the earlier statute to the extent of the repugnancy.” See Chris J. Yahnis Coastal, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 295 S.C. 243, 247, 368 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1988).
As noted, the City of Myrtle Beach enacted a number of ordinances and amendments to ordinances in response to the motorcycle rallies. Among the ordinances were ordinances 2008-61 through 67, which the City passed with the designation that any violation constituted an “administrative infraction.” The City also enacted Ordinance 2008-71, establishing an administrative hearing system which, as the City explained on its website, established a process “to handle infractions as specified in Ordinances 2008-61, 2008-62, 2008-63, 2008-64, 2008-65, 2008-66, and 2008-67.” Ordinance 2008-71 set forth in detail the rules, powers, and procedures of the administrative hearing system.
We find that the above-cited ordinances were enacted with the specific condition that they be enforced in the specially-crafted administrative hearing system. The ordinances therefore cannot be reconciled with a later ordinance abolishing the system. Consequently, the Motorcycle Ordinances continuing to reference “administrative infractions” were impliedly repealed.
We note, however, that in the same ordinance which repealed the administrative hearing system, the City amended Ordinances 2008-61 (accommodations restrictions) and 2008-65 (parking of trailers on public streets or unlicensed private lots) to designate those violations as “misdemeanors” rather than “administrative infractions.” Consequently, these ordinances are not impliedly repealed and remain in effect.
CONCLUSION
We find that the City Helmet Ordinance fails under implied field preemption due to the need for statewide uniformity and therefore issue a declaratory judgment invalidating the ordinance. Moreover, we hold that certain Motorcycle Ordinances were impliedly repealed by the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system.
JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONERS.
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
[1] Petitioners contend the following ordinances were invalidated by repeal of the ordinance establishing the administrative hearing system: 2008-61 (accommodations restrictions); 2008-62 (consumption and open possession of alcohol in parking areas); 2008-63 (use of parking lots for non-parking activities); 2008-64 (helmet and eyewear requirements for cycles and mopeds); 2008-65 (parking of trailers on public streets or unlicensed private lots); 2008-66 (convenience store and premises security); and 2008-67 (minor or juvenile curfew).
[2]Because we find that the Helmet Ordinance fails under implied field preemption, we need not reach Petitioners’ remaining preemption issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (appellate court need not discuss remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive). Additionally, we need not address Petitioners’ request for a writ of prohibition barring the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the alleged ordinance violations. See Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. National Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143, 148, 414 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1992) (“This court will not issue advisory opinions . . . .”).
[3] Though Petitioners phrase their argument as whether the administrative hearing ordinance is “severable” from the Motorcycle Ordinances, Petitioners actually argue implied repeal.
Feb 5, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, DUI & DWI, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
The following pending case below is a sad example of what can happen if you drink and drive. Serious injury can happen in an instant. In this case, she is left paralyzed from the waist down. This case is rather unique as it is the impaired driver herself who is suing. Certainly, there are several key defenses which will most probably end her case before it ever reaches a jury. Nevertheless, the facts highlight the need for bar owners and homeowners who serve alcolhol to be certain any customers or guests are of legal age and that they are safe to drive before leaving to get on the road. If these basis safety steps are not followed, then perhaps they should be held accountable. Tonight while enjoying the Super Bowl, please be aware of what can happen. Be Safe. Get Home.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
A South Carolina woman is suing the bar that served her alcohol as a minor the night she had a car accident that left her paralyzed.
Hess was 20 years old on Aug. 8, 2009 when she went to Jock’s Sports Grill in Beaumont, S.C. for a game of billiards, according to her lawsuit.
She alleged that she ordered an alcoholic drink at the bar and was served without being asked for identification. The legal drinking age in South Carolina is 21.
Hess accused the bar of several forms of negligence, including failure to “request and examine proof of identification,” serving alcohol to minors, and “failing to ascertain whether Plaintiff was impaired by the consumption of alcoholic beverages at the time Plaintiff purchased the alcoholic beverage.”
At about 1:05 a.m., Hess left the bar driving her own car and had a serious accident.
“The wheels of the motor vehicle Plaintiff was operating suddenly dropped off into a large unmaintained area on the shoulder of Alljoy Road, which caused Plaintiff to loose [sic] control of her vehicle and causing her to roll the vehicle over off the side of the road,” the lawsuit said.
As a result, Hess “suffered serious, permanently debilitating injuries causing the plaintiff to be paraplegic.” She blames the accident on the bar.
“The accident that resulted in Plaintiff being a paraplegic was due to and proximately caused by the negligence, recklessness, and willfulness and gross negligence of Defendant Jock’s Sports Grill,” the lawsuit said.
Attorneys representing the defendants deny “each and every allegation,” they each said in responses to the Hess’ lawsuit.
Their response lists eight possible ways Hess may have been negligent including driving while intoxicated, failing to keep her car under proper control, driving too fast for the conditions, and “failing to act in a reasonable and prudent manner.”
Jan 29, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
Safety Sphere Motorcycle Airbag Suit Turns You into a Giant Orange
December 17th, 2011by: Technabob
I’m one of those guys who thinks motorcycles are really cool, but I don’t ride one. I think it’s because I’ve always been convinced that I’d end up killing myself if I tried to negotiate the slick roads and maniac drivers of Chicago in the winter time. I actually knew a guy in college who rode a motorcycle and got in an accident and ended up as a paraplegic, so that doesn’t help with my anxieties.
But if I were to take up motorcycle riding, this would be protective gear which would convince me to ride.
Designed by Rejean Neron, the Safety Sphere is exactly what it sounds like. It’s a special bike suit that automatically inflates into a sphere, enveloping the rider and protecting them from injury if they ever go flying off the bike in a crash. The suit inflates to its full capacity in 5/100ths of a second, and fills with compressed air to cushion the impact. The sphere is made up of two layers of fabric, including an inner layer of thin elastic material, and an outer layer of parachute-type cloth. A battery connects to an electric ignition which triggers nitrocellulose canister, inflating the suit in the event of an impact.
Yes, the resulting expanded suit looks completely ridiculous. I’m reminded of that part ofWilly Wonka where Violet Beuregarde turns into a blueberry, except this time you’ll be turning into a navel orange. Still, I’d rather look stupid than end up dead. From the looks of things, you might still need some Oompa Loompas to come rescue you after an accident, too.
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This is one of those articles that may seem a little far fetched at first. However, given the seriousness of motorcycle injuries and the frequency of such accidents on our roadways, perhaps we should take another look. I like the bright orance safety suit. Afterall, just like with airbags in automobiles, you never want to actually need them. But, despite being as safe as possible, a serious motorcycle accident can occur in an instant because of another driver’s inattention or carelessness. This suit could very well become standard safety equipment for motorcyclists one day. We thank Technabob for introducing this cool technology that may be able to prevent serious injury or even death.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they collectively understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
Jan 21, 2012 | Car Accidents, DUI & DWI, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
Father, son die in motorcycle wreck; woman charged with DWI
MORGANTON, NC (WBTV) – Amie Jo Skeens has now been charged with murder in the wreck involving a father and son on a motorcycle two weeks ago.
Skeens, 37, was initially charged with DWI and felony hit and run after Stephen Moody and his son Kevin were killed October 25 on Airport-Rhodhiss Road. Skeens was charged with two counts of second degree murder on Wednesday morning.
District Attorney James C. Gaither told WBTV Skeens could face up to eighteen and a half years in prison for each count if convicted, in addition to the DWI charge and previous drug charges. More charges are also expected to be filed in connection with the wreck.
The father and son were riding on a motorcycle with friends just ahead of them on another motorcycle when Skeens, according to Troopers, came around the corner into their lane.
The first motorcycle was sideswiped but the Moody’s motorcycle was hit head-on, throwing father and son into the windshield and onto the roadway.
Skeens, according to troopers, left the scene and pulled the vehicle into a wooded area about a mile down the road.
She was spotted by neighbors there and was arrested when authorities arrived on the scene. Brent and Kevin Moody were pronounced dead at the scene of the wreck.
Skeens, say troopers, made a statement to the effect that she was “high.” A breathalyzer showed her blood alcohol level at .10, above the legal limit.
Authorities also secured a warrant to take some blood for further tests. Investigators think it’s possible she was under the influence of drugs as well at the time of the crash.
Skeens has a history of drug convictions and served probation. In her vehicle were pamphlets for Narcotics Anonymous and a book on the twelve step program the organization uses for recovering addicts.
She was served warrants from a 1996 case involving the alleged possession and sale of crack cocaine. Those warrants, according to officials, were never served at the time. Her name on the warrants is listed as Amie Jo Skeens Thrift.
Skeens is being held under a $50,000 bond for each murder charge in addition to the already $60,000 bond she received for the DWI and hit and run charges.
A first court appearance has been scheduled for November 7.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
