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Fort Mill Criminal Attorney – Probation Violation – Revocation Hearing

This SC Supreme Court case deals with a post-conviction relief petition (PCR) by a criminal defendant who claimed he was not properly advised by his lawyer. The Court found against the PCR relief, but this case also shows what can happen when probation is violated and subsequently revoked. In many criminal cases, the defendant is given a long sentence but a fairly short period of probation. As long as the defendant follows the rules, his probation term will end, and he is free to move on with his life. However, any significant violation can cause the probation to be revoked, and the defendant will be sent to prison for his original sentence. In many cases, a probation violation hearing can be defended. Better make sure your attorney knows what to argue here. The stakes of being sent to prison are too high to risk an inexperienced lawyer.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us today at 803-548-4444 for a private consultation. Or  visit our firm’s website at www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court


Harold B. Turner, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI


Appeal from Spartanburg County
John M. Milling, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No. 26708
Submitted April 22, 2009 – Filed August 24, 2009


AFFIRMED


Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Prentiss Counts, all of Columbia, for Respondent.


CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: In this case, the Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the post-conviction relief (PCR) court’s denial of relief to Petitioner Harold B. Turner.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1994, Petitioner pled guilty to second degree burglary and was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, suspended upon time served and five years probation.  Subsequently, his probation was revoked.  Petitioner did not directly appeal his probation revocation.  Petitioner filed an application for PCR alleging probation counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to a direct appeal.

At the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that after the revocation hearing, he asked probation counsel, “What can we do?” and that counsel responded “the judge made his ruling,” and testified that he would have requested an appeal if he had known his rights.  Probation counsel testified that there were no appealable issues stemming from the probation revocation and that Petitioner never inquired about an appeal.  The PCR court found that there were no non-frivolous grounds for an appeal and that no extraordinary circumstances existed and denied Petitioner relief.

This Court granted Petitioner’s request for a writ of certiorari, and Petitioner presents the following issue for review:

Did the PCR court err in finding probation counsel was not ineffective in failing to advise Petitioner of his right to a direct appeal from his probation revocation?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The burden of proof is on the applicant in post-conviction proceedings to prove the allegations in his application.  Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985).  On certiorari, the PCR court’s ruling should be upheld if it is supported by any evidence of probative value in the record.  Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).  However, this Court will reverse the PCR court’s decision when it is controlled by an error of law.  Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139, 145, 526 S.E.2d 222, 225 (2000).

LAW/ANALYSIS

As a primary matter, we must first address the basis upon which Petitioner claims he is entitled to relief.  Since Petitioner seeks relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner bases his PCR application on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  See Duckson v. State, 355 S.C. 596, 598, 586 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2003), citing McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356, 465 S.E.2d 352 (1995) (observing that an ineffective assistance claim is premised on the violation of an individual’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel).  However, a probationer does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.[1]  Rather, the right to counsel may arise pursuant to the Due Process Clause under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).[2]  In South Carolina, however, all persons charged with probation violations have a right to counsel and must be informed of this right pursuant to court rules and case law.  Barlet v. State, 288 S.C. 481, 483, 343 S.E.2d 620, 621 (1986); Rule 602(a), SCACR.

In Duckson, the parolee filed an application for PCR alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his parole revocation hearing.  In South Carolina, a parolee has a statutory right to have counsel present at a parole revocation hearing[3] but, similar to a probationer, does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  As Duckson makes clear, neither a parolee nor a probationer has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Accordingly, this Court held that because the parolee could not assert a Sixth Amendment violation and because he did not contend his due process rights were violated, the parolee failed to allege the parole revocation was unlawful and thus failed to state a claim cognizable in a PCR action.

We find the Duckson analysis instructive to the instant case.  Although parole revocation and probation revocation are different types of proceedings,[4] to the extent there is a constitutional right to counsel in either context, it exists only by virtue of the Due Process Clause.  See Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.3 (observing that, despite minor differences between parole and probation, the revocation of probation is constitutionally indistinguishable from the revocation of parole).  Petitioner has only alleged a Sixth Amendment violation, namely that probation counsel was ineffective in failing to inform him of his right to a direct appeal, and thus, under Duckson, it appears he has failed to state a cognizable claim in a PCR action.

However, Duckson is distinguishable from the instant case in an important respect.  Unlike a parolee, we have held that, pursuant to court rule, a probationer has a right to counsel.  See Barlet and Rule 602(a).  A parolee’s statutory right to have counsel present is not comparable to a probationer’s absolute right under state law to appointed counsel.  We now hold that because a probationer has a right to counsel, albeit not a Sixth Amendment right, the same analysis for ineffectiveness that applies in other PCR proceedings involving claims against counsel should, by analogy, apply in PCR proceedings involving claims against probation counsel.  In our view, this approach does not elevate form over substance by, for example, allowing a probationer to proceed on a due process violation but not allowing him to proceed on an ineffective assistance claim despite the fact that both claims stem from the failure to be informed of his right to appeal.  Additionally, this approach eases confusion as well as the burden on the lower courts by providing a uniform standard.[5]

To this end, we must determine whether, under our Strickland jurisprudence, probation counsel was ineffective for failing to inform Petitioner of his right to appeal the revocation of his probation.  We hold that he was not.

Following a trial, counsel must inform a defendant who has been found guilty of a crime of the possibility of an appeal and the method for taking an appeal.  Frasier v. State, 306 S.C. 158, 161, 410 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1991).  In a plea proceeding, however, there is no requirement that plea counsel inform a defendant of the right to a direct appeal absent extraordinary circumstances.  Weathers v. State, 319 S.C. 59, 61, 459 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1995); see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (holding that counsel has a constitutional duty to inform a defendant of his right to appeal a guilty plea if there is reason to think that a rational defendant would want to appeal or that the defendant demonstrated an interest in appealing).[6]

We hold that probation counsel is not required to inform a probationer of his right to an appeal absent extraordinary circumstances.  This holding is in accord with counsel’s duties at a plea hearing.  See Weathers, 319 S.C. at 61, 459 S.E.2d at 839 (holding that, “absent extraordinary circumstances, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be informed of the right to a direct appeal from a guilty plea.”).  In our view, a probationer should not be afforded additional protections in a probation revocation hearing, a proceeding that is not a stage of criminal prosecution and that occurs after sentencing, which are not constitutionally mandated in a guilty plea hearing.  In other words, probation counsel is not held to a higher performance standard than that imposed upon plea counsel.

In the instant case, the PCR court found probation counsel’s testimony more credible than Petitioner’s testimony.  Additionally, there is evidence in the record to support the PCR court’s finding that there were no non-frivolous grounds for an appeal and that no extraordinary circumstances existed.  Accordingly, because Petitioner failed to show extraordinary circumstances, he is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the PCR court’s order denying Petitioner relief.

WALLER, PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1] In Huckaby v. State, 305 S.C. 331, 408 S.E.2d 242 (1991), we held that a probationer must be informed of his right to counsel and he must make a willing and knowing waiver of counsel.  We also stated that “a probationer retains his full Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”  Id. at 335, 408 S.E.2d at 244.  Because a probationer does not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this statement is incorrect, and any interpretation of the opinion asserting that a probationer is afforded the same constitutional protections as an accused is erroneous.  A South Carolina probationer’s right to counsel in a probation revocation hearing is grounded in our case law and court rules.  A constitutional right to counsel may arise pursuant to the Due Process Clause, but cannot arise pursuant to the Sixth Amendment.

[2] In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court held that whether a probationer has a constitutional right to counsel in a revocation hearing should be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the complexity of alleged violations and whether the probationer can meaningfully contest the alleged violations.

[3] S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-50 (Supp. 2002).

[4] Parole eligibility is a collateral consequence of sentencing and is a matter that falls within the province of the Board of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services.  Brown v. State, 306 S.C. 381, 382, 412 S.E.2d 399, 400 (1991); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-13 (Supp. 2006).  Probation, on the other hand, is a matter within the jurisdiction of the trial court and is judicially-imposed at the time of sentencing.  Duckson, 355 S.C. at 598 n. 2, 586 S.E.2d at 578 n. 2; S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-450 (Supp. 2006).

[5] Our holding today does not alter our PCR jurisprudence regarding claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor should it be interpreted as creating additional rights to PCR applicants.  Indeed, this Court has granted relief based on “ineffective assistance” of PCR counsel despite the fact that the right to PCR counsel arises from Rule 71.1, SCRCP, and not from the constitution.  See e.g., Washington v. State, 324 S.C. 232, 478 S.E.2d 833 (1996) (granting PCR where the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of PCR counsel due to so many procedural irregularities) and Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991) (recognizing that the constitutional right to counsel does not extend to discretionary appeals on collateral attack, but allowing a PCR applicant to receive a belated appeal from the denial of his initial PCR application where first PCR counsel failed to file a notice of appeal); but see Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 451, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1991) (holding that an allegation that prior PCR counsel was ineffective is not per se a sufficient reason allowing for a successive PCR application).

[6] Although decided prior to Flores-Ortega, the Weathers analysis is compatible with the Flores-Ortega analysis and remains good law.

SC Criminal Sexual Conduct – Critical Trial Objections

This SC Supreme Court decision illustrates how timely objections at trial can prove critical to the outcome of a case. Here, the prosecutor, obviously overcome with personal emotion in a child sexual abuse case, crossed a proverbial line and basically asked the jury to “speak for the victim.” While such feelings are natural given the horrific nature of this crime and particular facts involved here, the prosecutor has a duty to remain professional and take steps to make sure every criminal defendant receives a fair trial. It is also the duty and obligation of the criminal defesne attorney to zealously defend his client, regardless of any personal feelings he may have about the case or the defendant. Better make sure your attorney has the professional discipline to aggressively defend your case, especially if the crime is emotionally charged. No matter what the crime, it is your lawyer’s job to do everything possible to get you a fair trial and afford you due process.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court


Brandon Leandre Brown, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI


Appeal From Florence County
Michael Nettles, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No.  26691
Submitted June 24, 2009 – Filed July 27, 2009


REVERSED


Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Julie M. Thames, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Respondent.


JUSTICE BEATTY:  In this post-conviction relief (PCR) case, this Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR judge’s order granting Brandon Leandre Brown a new trial for his convictions of first-degree, criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSC) and transmitting a sexual disease.  The State contends the PCR judge erred in finding Brown’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain comments made by the solicitor during his closing argument.  We reverse.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At trial, four witnesses, all of whom either lived across the street or were visiting across the street from Brown’s residence on August 4, 2001, testified they observed Brown in his three-year-old stepdaughter’s bedroom on top of the child moving his body in a manner that indicated sexual activity.  One of the witnesses testified that “[Brown was] humping up and down on her.”  The witnesses testified they were able to see the incident through the child’s bedroom window because the blinds were wide open, the light was on in the bedroom, and it was dark outside at 11:30 p.m.  One witness, upon his initial observation, retrieved a pair of binoculars to confirm what he thought he had seen.  Based on their observations, the witnesses became upset, called the police, and then went to Brown’s residence to assist the child and to confront Brown.  All four witnesses testified that when Brown answered the door, he had an erection.

Shortly after the incident, officers with the Timmonsville Police Department responded to Brown’s residence.  After interviewing the witnesses for approximately two hours, the officers took Brown to the police station where he gave two audio-taped statements.  These statements were admitted at trial.  In these statements, Brown denied that he intended to sexually assault his stepdaughter; however, he admitted that he became aroused while wrestling with her and that he may have accidentally penetrated her.  In his first statement, Brown explained that he just got too close to the child and that his penis “might have hit her a couple of times.”  In his second statement, Brown stated that it was possible that penetration occurred but that he did not intend to penetrate her.  Toward the end of the interview, Brown stated “I came . . . into her a couple of times but not intentionally.”  When questioned at trial about the incident, Brown testified that he was tickling and wrestling with the child but denied that he penetrated her.

Rhonda Turner, Brown’s ex-wife and the mother of the child, testified that during the time leading up to the incident and the day of the incident, Brown was unemployed and had access to her daughter during the daytime.  In describing her relationship with Brown, she stated that they were married for approximately a year and had a son, who was born on July 4, 2001.  Rhonda admitted that she contracted gonorrhea from Brown.  She testified that she learned of the STD when her physician’s office called her and instructed her to report to the office on the Monday following the August 4, 2001 incident between Brown and her daughter.  During that phone call, Rhonda was informed that she had tested positive for gonorrhea and needed to be seen by her doctor.  Rhonda delayed this visit for one day because she took her daughter to be medically evaluated on the Monday following the incident.  As a result of this evaluation, the child was given a shot for gonorrhea.

When questioned about the incident between Brown and her daughter, Rhonda testified that she spoke with Brown about it at the Timmonsville Police Department.  During this conversation, Brown said, “Well, I mean, I may have, you know, been playing with her; and my penis may have fallen out of my boxers; and I may have gotten erected; and her panties may have gone to the side.”  Rhonda, however, testified that when she spoke with Brown again during a telephone conversation he said “he didn’t do it.”

As part of its case, the State presented Kathy Saunders as an expert witness in “child sexual assault” and “child sexual abuse.”  Saunders testified that she examined the child two days after the incident because she was out-of-town and unable to evaluate the child when she was taken to the emergency room immediately after the incident with Brown.  As a result of her examination, Saunders discovered “copious” amounts of green discharge coming from the child’s vaginal opening.  Saunders characterized this finding as a “classic” symptom of gonorrhea.  Although there was no evidence of an acute injury causing vaginal tearing or bleeding, Saunders noted in her examination that there was redness around the child’s labia and surrounding tissue.  Specifically, Saunders testified “[t]here was some mild redness, with what appeared to be resolution of labial lesions or just some type of contact dermatitis.”  She further stated the tissue in the surrounding area “appeared kind of red, very thickened or swollen.”    Saunders indicated that these physical findings could be consistent with “someone penetrating the [child’s] labia.”  In addition to her physical examination, Saunders testified the child’s mother told her that the child had recently been wetting the bed, complained of stomach aches and nightmares, and had vaginal discharge.  Saunders believed these symptoms could be indicative of sexual abuse.

In addition to Brown’s testimony and the testimony of several character witnesses, the defense presented evidence attempting to refute that Brown could have transmitted gonorrhea to the child during the August 4, 2001 incident.  Specifically, the defense presented medical records which indicated that Brown had been treated for gonorrhea on May 23, 2001, and July 26, 2001.

In support of its theory, the defense also offered the testimony of Dr. Elizabeth Lynn Harvey Baker-Gibbs, an expert witness on the “diagnosis and treatment of sexual abuse.”  Dr. Baker-Gibbs testified regarding the type and effectiveness of the medication prescribed for the treatment of gonorrhea.  When presented with the facts of the instant case, she opined that if Brown had properly taken his prescribed medication on July 26, 2001, he would not have been contagious after July 29, 2001.  Based on these facts, she ultimately concluded that Brown would not have been contagious on August 4, 2001, the date of the incident.

Following motions from counsel, the trial concluded with closing arguments.  At end of his closing argument, the solicitor stated:

I embrace my burden because I represent the State of South Carolina.  And I think someone said at the beginning of this trial this is trying to protect the rights of people.  Well, I tell you what.  I’m here to protect the innocent.  I’m here to protect [child victim] a four-year-old child now.  Three-year-old little child at that time.  And I am the last person that you’re going to hear speak up for her.

So, I ask you, when you go back in that jury room, you speak up for [child victim].  We can never put her back to where she was before this abuse occurred.  But we can make sure that the perpetrator is punished.  So when you go back in that jury room to deliberate, ladies and gentlemen, speak up for [child victim].

Brown’s trial counsel did not object to these remarks.  The jury convicted Brown of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and transmitting a sexual disease.  Subsequently, the trial judge sentenced Brown to twenty-five years imprisonment for the CSC charge and a concurrent term of thirty days imprisonment for the transmission of a sexual disease charge.

Brown appealed his convictions and sentences to the Court of Appeals.  In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Brown’s convictions and sentences.  State v. Brown, Op. No. 2004-UP-358 (S.C. Ct. App. filed June 4, 2004).

Following the decision of the Court of Appeals, Brown filed a timely PCR application.  Once represented by counsel, Brown filed an amended PCR application.  In these applications, Brown alleged his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects, including counsel’s failure to object to the remarks made by the solicitor in his closing argument.

At the PCR hearing, Brown’s counsel asserted the solicitor’s comments “to speak up for the victim” amounted to a “Golden Rule” type argument that has been deemed improper by our state appellate courts.  Additionally, PCR counsel contended the improper argument was prejudicial because it appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury by asking the jury to be an advocate for the child victim.

Brown’s trial counsel, the only witness called to testify, admitted that an objection should have been made to the solicitor’s comments.   However, he stated the reason “those statements were not objected to was because I didn’t want to exacerbate a bad set of facts to point out to the jury something that would already aggravate what appeared to be a pretty bad case.”  Trial counsel also pointed out the “gravity of the evidence” the State presented against Brown.  He further noted he did not want to give the jury a reason to dislike or hate his client.

In an oral ruling, the PCR judge informed counsel that he was granting Brown relief in the form of a new trial solely on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the remarks made by the solicitor during closing argument.

In a detailed written order, the PCR judge explained that trial counsel’s failure to object to the solicitor’s closing argument was “clearly error.”  The judge further found that “[t]here is a reasonable probability, based upon the evidence before this Court, that failure to object to this inappropriate argument undermined the confidence in the outcome in this trial.”

In terms of the evidence, the judge concluded that there was not overwhelming evidence of guilt given it “consisted of very questionable eyewitness testimony, [Brown’s] two statements, and the fact that at some point, although not at the time of the incident, [Brown] had gonorrhea.”  The judge characterized the eyewitness testimony as “questionable” in light of defense counsel’s contention at trial that due to the position of the child’s bedroom window “there was no possible way the witnesses could have seen what they claimed to have seen.”  Additionally, the judge referenced the State’s expert witness testimony that the child could not have tested positive for gonorrhea the day after the incident and the testimony that Brown could not have been contagious on the date of the incident.  The judge further noted that Brown denied sexually assaulting the child and that there was no evidence of “tearing or obvious injury to the child’s vagina.”

The judge also rejected the State’s contention that the solicitor’s comments were so limited that they could not have affected the trial.  Specifically, the judge stated that “[g]iven the seriousness of the offense and the emotions involved, these comments were more than enough to place the jury in a position of being asked to stand up for, help, protect, and advocate for a very small child.”  The judge believed that “[i]t is clear that the Solicitor’s statements encouraged the jury to depart from neutrality and decide the case based on passion and bias rather than the evidence, which led to the jury’s verdict being undermined.”  Ultimately, the PCR judge found trial counsel was ineffective and, as a result, granted Brown a new trial as to both of his convictions.

The State petitioned for and was granted a writ of certiorari for this Court to review the PCR judge’s order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  “There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decisions in the case.”  Tate v. State, 351 S.C. 418, 425, 570 S.E.2d 522, 526 (2002).

In a PCR proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985).  In order to prove that counsel was ineffective, the PCR applicant must show that:  (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 109, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).  “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.”  Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331, 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007).  “Furthermore, when a defendant’s conviction is challenged, ‘the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’” Id. (quotingStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)).

This Court will uphold the findings of the PCR court if there is any evidence of probative value to support them.  Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).  However, if no probative evidence supports these findings, the Court will not uphold the findings of the PCR court.  Jackson v. State, 355 S.C. 568, 570, 586 S.E.2d 562, 563 (2003).  “The decision of the PCR judge may be reversed when it is controlled by an error of law.”  Hiott v. State, 381 S.C. 622, 625, 674 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2009).

DISCUSSION

The State contends the PCR judge erred in granting Brown a new trial on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to certain portions of the solicitor’s closing argument.  Initially, the State asserts that counsel was not ineffective given he “articulated a valid reason for not objecting when he stated he was worried about the jury hating his client.”  In support of this assertion, the State points to the testimony of trial counsel that “there was a lot of evidence against [Brown] and that he did not wish to aggravate an already bad situation.”  The State also references trial counsel’s testimony that the solicitor’s comments were limited in that they were made “quickly.”  Even if trial counsel’s performance was deficient in that there was no objection to the solicitor’s comments, the State claims that Brown was not prejudiced in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial.

“A solicitor’s closing argument must be carefully tailored so as not to appeal to the personal biases of the jury.”  Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 609, 602 S.E.2d 738, 744 (2004).  “The argument must not be calculated to arouse the jurors’ passions or prejudices, and its content should stay within the record and reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.”  Id. at 609-10, 602 S.E.2d at 744.

“‘While the solicitor should prosecute vigorously, his duty is not to convict a defendant but to see justice done.’”  State v. Northcutt, 372 S.C. 207, 222, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881 (2007) (quoting State v. Linder, 276 S.C. 304, 312, 278 S.E.2d 335, 339 (1981)).  “‘The solicitor’s closing argument must, of course, be based on this principle.’”  Id.  “A Golden Rule argument asking the jurors to place themselves in the victim’s shoes tends to completely destroy all sense of impartiality of the jurors, and its effect is to arouse passion and prejudice.”  State v. Reese, 370 S.C. 31, 38, 633 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006).

“On appeal, the appellate court will view the alleged impropriety of the solicitor’s argument in the context of the entire record, including whether the trial judge’s instructions adequately cured the improper argument and whether there is overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”  Simmons v. State, 331 S.C. 333, 338, 503 S.E.2d 164, 166 (1998).  “Improper comments do not automatically require reversal if they are not prejudicial to the defendant, and the appellant has the burden of proving he did not receive a fair trial because of the alleged improper argument.”  Humphries v. State, 351 S.C. 362, 373, 570 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2002).  “The relevant question is whether the solicitor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id.see State v. Hornsby, 326 S.C. 121, 129, 484 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1997) (“A denial of due process occurs when a defendant in a criminal trial is denied the fundamental fairness essential to the concept of justice.”).

Turning to the facts of the instant case, we find the PCR judge correctly concluded the solicitor’s remarks were improper in that they amounted to an impermissible “Golden Rule” type argument.  See State v. Reese, 359 S.C. 260, 271, 597 S.E.2d 169, 175 (Ct. App.  2004) (recognizing that a “Golden Rule” argument which suggests to jurors to put themselves in the shoes of one of the parties is generally impermissible because it encourages the jurors to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than evidence), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 370 S.C. 31, 633 S.E.2d 898 (2006) (affirming the Court of Appeals’ finding that the defendant was entitled to a new trial based on the solicitor’s “Golden Rule” closing argument in which he repeatedly asked jurors to “speak” for the murdered victim).

Here, it is indisputable that the case was “emotionally charged” given it involved sexual misconduct with a three-year-old child.  Thus, the solicitor’s remarks imploring the jurors to “speak for” the victim undeniably asked the jurors to set aside their impartiality and, instead, consider the evidence from the subjective position of the child victim.

In view of this improper argument, we agree with the PCR judge that it was incumbent upon Brown’s trial counsel to object to the solicitor’s closing remarks.  Furthermore, although we do not believe trial counsel was disingenuous in articulating a trial strategy to explain his failure to object to these comments, we find this “strategy” cannot be construed as a valid one given the evident impropriety of the solicitor’s remarks.  Cf. Stokes v. State, 308 S.C. 546, 548, 419 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1992) (“Where . . . counsel articulates a valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel.”);Whitehead v. State, 308 S.C. 119, 122, 417 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1992) (recognizing that “[c]ourts must be wary of second-guessing counsel’s trial tactics; and where counsel articulates a valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel”).

Based on the foregoing, we hold trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the challenged portion of the solicitor’s closing argument because it constituted a “Golden Rule” argument which impermissibly appealed to the passion of the jurors by asking them to “speak up” for the child victim.  However, we find Brown did not satisfy his requisite burden of proving that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance the result of his trial would have been different.

First, the solicitor’s comments came at the very end of his closing argument and were limited in duration.  Thus, we find the solicitor’s comments did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.  SeeSmith v. State, 375 S.C. 507, 654 S.E.2d 523 (2007) (concluding any impropriety in the solicitor’s closing argument was not sufficient to grant defendant post-conviction relief where solicitor’s improper use of the pronoun “I” was limited, did not recur throughout his argument, there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and the trial judge instructed the jury not to consider counsel’s statements as evidence); see also Von Dohlen, 360 S.C. at 613-14,  602 S.E.2d at 746 (holding trial counsel, during the penalty phase of a capital case, was deficient in failing to object to solicitor’s comment for the jurors to put themselves in the victim’s shoes, but finding such deficient performance was not prejudicial); cf. State v. McDaniel, 320 S.C. 33, 462 S.E.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding solicitor’s use of “you” forty-five times during closing argument asking the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim constituted reversible error and warranted a new trial).

Secondly, there was overwhelming evidence of Brown’s guilt.  The State presented four eyewitnesses who testified to seeing Brown commit the sexual misconduct against the child.  Each of the witnesses testified they could see into the child’s bedroom window because the blinds were wide open, it was dark outside, and there was a light on in the bedroom.  They further explained that they were able to see more clearly when they approached the window to confront Brown by banging on the bedroom window.  Additionally, each witness testified that when Brown opened the door, he had an erection.

Although Brown’s defense counsel attempted to establish that the witnesses’ testimony differed from their written statements regarding certain details, the witnesses were adamant that they could clearly see through the child’s bedroom window.  They also explained that they wrote their statements for the police immediately after witnessing the incident while sitting in the dark on top of the police cars.

The State also presented the two audio-taped statements given by Brown in which he admitted to “accidental” or “possible” penetration of the child.  Brown’s ex-wife also testified that when she spoke with Brown at the police station he admitted that he had been playing with the child and said, “my penis may have fallen out of my boxers; and I may have gotten erected; and her panties may have gone to the side.”

Additionally, the State’s expert witness testified that the child exhibited physical and psychological symptoms which were indicative of sexual abuse.  This expert witness also confirmed that the child had been diagnosed with gonorrhea.  Although the defense presented evidence that Brown may not have been contagious on the day of the incident, there was testimony that prior to the incident he was diagnosed with gonorrhea and had access to the child alone during the day.

Finally, the jury only deliberated for thirty-eight minutes before finding Brown guilty of both charges.  Notably, the trial judge also recognized that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming when he stated during sentencing:

I want to say to you also that the evidence in this case, sir, was overwhelming, including four eyewitnesses, which is very unusual for a crime which generally occurs in secret; your obvious and your unnatural state of arousal when you went to the door or when you were confronted about this; the transmission of gonorrhea to a child victim; and your own admissions that are contained in your own statements, sir.  All of these are overwhelming evidence in the view of this court.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that any impropriety in the solicitor’s closing argument was not sufficient to warrant the PCR judge’s decision to grant a new trial.

CONCLUSION

Although we find the PCR judge correctly determined that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the solicitor’s “Golden Rule” closing argument, we hold Brown failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that but for this error the result of his trial would have been different.  Accordingly, the decision of the PCR judge is

REVERSED.

TOAL, C.J., WALLER, PLEICONES and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.


SC Crack Cocaine Distribution- No Objection – No Appeal

This SC Supreme Court case highlights the critical importance of making proper objections during trial to the admission of evidence and/or testimony. Here, the all important videotape was introduced and admitted without objection by the criminal defense attorney. Subsequently, after being convicted, the judge on his own granted a new trial. The State appealed this action and won. The result is the prior conviction will stand, and the criminal defendant will go to prison. Had an objection been made, the outcome could have been different. Better make sure your criminal attorney knows the rules of procedure and when to object to the admission of evidence against you. As this case shows, a single, properly made objection can make or break a case.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court


The State, Respondent,

v.

Jeremiah Dicapua, Petitioner.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS


Appeal From Horry County
J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No. 26684
Heard February 3, 2009 – Filed July 13, 2009

AFFIRMED


Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster; Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh; Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott; Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor John Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.


JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  As a result of a videotaped sting operation, Jeremiah Dicapua was convicted and sentenced for distribution of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.  On the day following sentencing, the trial court sua sponte vacated the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial on the basis of perceived weaknesses in the videotape evidence, even though the tape was admitted without objection.  Moreover, the trial court ruled that the videotape could not be admitted in evidence in the new trial.  The State appealed, contending the sua sponte grant of a new trial constituted legal error warranting reversal.

Because Dicapua waived any direct challenge to the videotape by consenting to its admission, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s sua sponte, new trial order and reinstated the sentence.  State v. Dicapua, 373 S.C. 452, 455-56, 646 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2007).  We granted a writ of certiorari.  We affirm.

I. 

The Horry County Police Department and the Myrtle Beach Police Department conducted a drug sting in a hotel.  One hotel room was a control room where the officers observed the suspects and the informant.  The adjoining hotel room served as the transaction room, which was set up with separate video and audio recording devices.  On the day in question, the audio equipment malfunctioned.

The hotel room was initially searched by the police for drugs, and the informant was searched as well.  The informant was given one hundred and eighty dollars in marked money by the police.  The informant and another woman in the hotel room were arrested earlier that day for prostitution.

The informant briefly left the room and reentered with Dicapua.  The informant counted out the money and placed it on the bed.  Next, Dicapua counted the money and appeared to drop something on the bed.  The informant then placed an unknown substance in her pocket.  After the police entered the transaction room, the police searched Dicapua and found drugs.  The police also located drugs on the informant for a total of 2.4 grams of crack cocaine.  Dicapua admitted the informant gave him one hundred and sixty dollars.

Dicapua was tried for and convicted of distribution of crack cocaine and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.  At trial, Dicapua did not object to the admission of the videotape.  Following the State’s case, Dicapua made multiple motions: for a dismissal and a mistrial due to the lack of a link between the drugs found on the informant and Dicapua, for a directed verdict due to the “totality” of the State’s case, and for dismissal due to entrapment.  Notably, these motions did not refer to the admission of the videotape.

Following the jury’s guilty verdicts, Dicapua moved to set aside the verdict as there was no evidence Dicapua intended to sell additional drugs and “the objections and request going back to the [informant], the chain, and all those things.”  Again, these motions did not implicate the admission of the videotape.  The trial court sentenced Dicapua to thirty months for both charges to run concurrently.

The next day the trial court sua sponte ordered a new trial because of concerns about the videotape.  The trial court additionally ordered, “it is the decision of this Court to suppress the introduction of the videotape in any new trial to be had on the charges.”[1]  The State served its notice of appeal.  The trial court subsequently held a hearing to supplement the record and further explain its decision.[2]

The State appealed the trial court’s sua sponte order.  The court of appeals reversed.  State v. Dicapua, 373 S.C. 452, 456, 646 S.E.2d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2007).  The court of appeals majority found an abuse of discretion by the trial court’s granting of a new trial for a waived issue, the admission of the videotape.  Id. at 455, 646 S.E.2d at 152.  One panel member of the court of appeals concurred, addressing the matter of appealability.  Id. at 457, 646 S.E.2d at 153.  This Court granted Dicapua’s petition for certiorari.

II.

We first address the threshold matter of appealability.  “The State may only appeal a new trial order if, in granting it, the trial judge committed an error of law.”  State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 10, 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007).  To determine if an error of law occurred, it is necessary to examine the merits of the case.  Id. at 11, 654 S.E.2d at 836.  We find an error of law occurred when the trial court granted a new trial on the basis of evidence admitted with Dicapua’s consent.  Because of the error of law, the matter is appealable.

We now turn to the legal issue which resolves this case—may a trial court in a criminal case sua sponte order a new trial on a ground not raised by a party?  We answered this question “no” in the context of a civil proceeding in Southern Railway Co. v. Coltex, Inc., 285 S.C. 213, 214, 329 S.E.2d 736, 736 (1985) (“The sole issue is whether a trial judge ex mero motu[3] can grant a new trial on a ground not raised by a party.  We hold he cannot.”).[4]  We hold the same result must follow in a criminal case.[5]  Moreover, to affirm the grant of a new trial on a waived issue in a criminal case would lend this Court’s imprimatur to a trial court’s impromptu grant of post conviction relief.

By consenting to the admission of the videotape evidence, Dicapua waived any direct challenge to the admission of the evidence.  Concomitantly, the trial court lacked authority to grant relief on the basis of a ground not raised by Dicapua.  We hold the granting of a new trial sua sponte on a ground waived by a party is an error of law.

AFFIRMED.

TOAL, C.J., WALLER, PLEICONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.

[1]  Counsel for Dicapua conceded at oral argument that it was error to preemptively suppress the videotape at a new trial.

[2]  Because the filing of the appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, we may not consider the trial court’s post-appeal explanation.

[3]  Ex mero motu is a synonymn for sua sponte.  Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (7th ed. 1999).

[4]  As in the case at hand, in Southern Railway, Southern waived the ground on which the trial court sua sponte granted a new trial.  285 S.C. at 215-16, 329 S.E.2d at 737-38.  Specifically, the trial court in Southern Railway stated that “[t]his new trial is not granted on the grounds as contended by [Southern] . . . .”  Id. at 215, 329 S.E.2d 737.  In reversing the sua sponte grant of a new trial, we held “Southern waived the right to claim the omitted charge was error by not objecting to its omission at the trial level.  Therefore, the omitted charge was not properly before the trial court, the Court of Appeals, or this Court.”  Id. at 216, 329 S.E.2d at 737-38.

[5]  We acknowledge Rule 59(d), SCRCP, allows a civil trial court to order a new trial within ten days of the entry of judgment for “any reason for which [the trial court] might have granted a new trial on motion of a party.”  We further acknowledge that when a civil trial court exercises its discretionary right to sit as a thirteenth juror and grants a new trial when the verdict is contrary to the evidence, its decision will be upheld if there is any evidence to support it.  Southern Railway, 285 S.C. at 216, 329 S.E.2d at 738.

SC Criminal – Trafficking Cocaine – Prison Sentence Based on Amount of Drug

This SC Supreme Court decision demonstrates how important every detail can be in a criminal case. Here, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to a statutorily required 25 years in prison and a $100,000 fine for trafficking cocaine based upon an amount of cocaine not proven by the State. However, on appeal, it was concluded that the jury was charged inappropriately and could only support a greatly reduced sentence of 3-10 years and a $25,000 fine. Every nuance in a criminal case can make all the difference. Better make sure your defense attorney investigates every aspect of your case and knows how to take full advantage at trial. There is too much at stake to risk an inexperienced lawyer.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court


Gina L. Dervin, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.


ON WRIT OF CERTIORARO


Appeal From Kershaw County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No.  26755
Submitted November 18, 2009 – Filed December 21, 2009


REVERSED AND REMANDED


Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General Brian T. Petrano, all of Columbia, for Respondent.


JUSTICE WALLER: We granted a writ of certiorari to perform an Austin v. State  review of the denial of Petitioner Gina Dervin’s application for post conviction relief (PCR).  We reverse and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

Dervin was indicted for trafficking cocaine.   The indictment alleged she had trafficked between 200-400 grams of cocaine.  During her trial, the court twice instructed the jury that Dervin could be convicted of trafficking if she was in actual or constructive possession of ten grams or more of cocaine.  The jury found her guilty.

At sentencing, Dervin requested the judge sentence her to the minimum possible sentence, to which the court responded:

Trafficking in cocaine — and in this case trafficking in cocaine in a substantial amount — the amount in this case is from 200 grams – more than 200 grams but less than 400 grams.   And that I will tell you is the second highest category or volume of traffic of cocaine provided for in the trafficking statute. . . .

Our Legislature has mandated a sentence in a trafficking case, and that is a mandatory 25-year sentence and a mandatory $100,000 fine.  So I have no choice other than to impose the sentence required by law.

Accordingly, Dervin was sentenced to twenty-five years and a $100,000 fine for trafficking.  The Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentences on direct appeal.  State v. Dervin, Op. No. 2003-UP-484 (S.C. Ct. App. filed August 20, 2003).

Dervin’s first PCR application was denied, and no appeal was filed.  Dervin filed this subsequent PCR application in May 2007, alleging PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the denial of the first PCR application.   The court held Dervin was entitled to a belated review of the denial of her first application pursuant to Austin v. State, 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395 (1991), and we granted certiorari.

ISSUE

Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to object to Dervin’s twenty-five year sentence for trafficking more than 200 grams of cocaine when the trial judge only charged the jury to consider whether petitioner was guilty of trafficking ten or more grams of cocaine?

DISCUSSION

Dervin contends trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to imposition of a twenty-five year sentence for trafficking between 200-400 grams of cocaine, because the jury was only required to determine she trafficked ten or more grams of cocaine, but that it did not necessarily determine she possessed over 200 grams.  Dervin contends the United States Supreme Court’s decisions inApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) require the amount of drugs to be submitted to the jury to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We agree.

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the United State Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (court explained that “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant).

The state asserts there is no Apprendi violation because the twenty-five year sentence imposed here is within the statutory maximum.  While the state is correct in asserting that  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-370(e)(2)(e) permits up to a thirty year sentence and a $200,000 fine for trafficking over 400 grams of cocaine, the only amount actually charged to the jury here was that it could convict Dervin if it found she possessed “more than 10 grams.”  There is no indication in the jury’s verdict that it found anything more than this amount.  Accordingly, given the trial court’s instruction, the applicable sentence for possession of ten grams falls under § 44-53-370(e)(2)(a)(1) and is a maximum of ten years and a $25,000 fine.  Accord United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant).

Due process requires the State to prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 602 S.E.2d 392 (2004) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).  A defendant, therefore, cannot “be exposed to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.”  United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 543 (6th Cir. 2000).

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Supreme Court reiterated its holding inApprendi that, under the Sixth Amendment, all facts used to increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be charged and proven to a jury.   542 U.S. at —-, 124 S.Ct. at 2536.  The relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Simpson v. United States, 376 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2004).  See also United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508  (7th Cir. 2004).  UnderBlakely, the relevant statutory maximum “is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” 542 U.S. at 303-304, 124 S.Ct. at 2537.

We find the maximum permissible sentence here, pursuant to Apprendi and Blakely, is controlled by the amount which was specifically submitted to the jury, i.e., that it could convict Dervin of trafficking if it believed she possessed ten or more grams of cocaine.  Accordingly, the maximum sentence in the present case should have been that for trafficking between 10-28 grams, which is 3-10 years, and a $25,000 fine.  Therefore, the trial court’s imposition of a twenty-five year sentence for trafficking between 200-400 grams of cocaine violated Apprendi because the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dervin possessed that amount of cocaine.  Further, we find counsel was ineffective in failing to object to impostion of a 25 year sentence.  We reverse the denial of PCR and remand for resentencing.[1]     

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.

[1]  Although an Apprendi error may be deemed harmless, Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), we do not find the error harmless in the present case.

Proper Case Investigation and Trial Presentation in Criminal Cases

This recent SC Court of Appeals decision demonstrates what is expected and required of attorneys in complex criminal cases, including pre-trial investigation and court room presentation. Every potential defense must be evaluated and called at trial to properly defend a criminal defendant. Alibi witnesses, DNA evidence, any discrepancies in testimony must be aggressively pursued as part of your client’s defense. If these requirements are not met, your client can pay for a crime they may not have committed. It is the criminal defense attorney’s role to pursue every lead, every possible avenue. Better make sure your attorney knows where to look and what to look for and is willing to fight every aspect of the case against you in court.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Joseph Walker, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.


Appeal From Aiken County
Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No.  4946
Heard October 5, 2011 – Filed February 22, 2012


REVERSED


Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mary S. Williams, Assistant Attorney General Robert D. Corney, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Respondent.

FEW, C.J.: This is a post-conviction relief (PCR) action arising out of Joseph Walker’s convictions for kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct.  The circuit court granted Walker’s PCR application based on trial counsel’s failure to investigate a potential alibi witness and the cumulative prejudicial effect of three other alleged instances of deficient performance.  We agree with the PCR court that trial counsel’s performance regarding the alibi witness was deficient under the Sixth Amendment.  However, we find the witness’s testimony presented at the PCR hearing did not meet the legal definition of an alibi, and thus Walker failed to prove prejudice.  We also find the PCR court erred in granting relief based on the cumulative effect of counsel’s deficient performance.  We reverse.

I.   Facts and Procedural History

The victim testified that on March 2, 2002, she sought a man’s help in fixing her broken-down car at a BP gas station in Denmark, South Carolina.  The man fixed her car with a wire he purchased nearby for $30.  The victim did not have enough money with her, so she told the man to follow her home so she could pay him.  She said the man came into her house uninvited, blindfolded her, drove her to his house, and raped her throughout the night.  Early the next morning the man blindfolded her again, drove her home, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone.  The victim testified that a few hours after she got home, she drank a rum and coke to calm her nerves.

The victim identified a man in the surveillance videotape from the BP station as her assailant.  The BP store manager then identified the man as Joseph Walker.  Prior to this incident, the victim had never met Walker or been to his house.  However, the police were able to match precisely the detailed descriptions the victim gave of her assailant’s truck and house with Walker’s truck and house.  Walker was arrested on March 22, 2002, twenty days after the alleged crime.  He submitted to a video interview with the police in which he claimed he was with his girlfriend, Robina Reed, on the night of the crime.  Walker was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping.  The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of twenty-four years in prison.  This court affirmed the convictions and sentences.  State v. Walker, Op. No. 2004-UP-618 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Dec. 9, 2004).

In January 2005, Walker filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Walker argued trial counsel was ineffective because she did not (1) investigate Reed as an alibi witness, (2) ask for a continuance to await the written results of a DNA test, (3) cross-examine the victim about her alcohol use, and (4) cross-examine the victim and call other witnesses about the victim’s conflicting statements as to the time of the incident.

Trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing that she watched the DVD of Walker’s interview.  In the interview, Walker referred to Reed numerous times and claimed he could not have committed the crimes because he spent the night with her on March 2, 2002.  Specifically, Walker admitted he was at the BP station on March 2, but denied helping the victim fix her car.  He said he left the BP station and went to see Reed at Hardee’s, where she worked as a manager.  Walker said he then stayed at a friend’s house until about 10:00 p.m., when he drove to Reed’s house to spend the night.

Despite watching the DVD of the interview, trial counsel did not investigate Reed as a potential witness.  At the PCR hearing, she claimed she thought her investigator was following up on Reed.  Walker testified he told the investigator about Reed, and the investigator wrote Reed’s name in the case file.  Trial counsel said she did not know what, if anything, her investigator did to investigate Reed.  She also testified she “was not aware of any claim that [Walker] was with anyone on” the night of the crime.  The PCR court summed up trial counsel’s knowledge of Reed as a potential alibi witness in the following question:

The court: So, there is an interview tape of the defendant that says he was with . . . Ms. Reed on the night of the incident.  That name appears in the file, but we don’t know what was done as far as finding out what Ms. Reed would or would not have said; is that correct?

[Trial counsel]: Yes, your honor.

Reed testified at the PCR hearing that Walker was her boyfriend on March 2, 2002.  She said Walker had a key to her house and spent most weekend nights with her.  When asked if she and Walker spent the night together on March 2, 2002, Reed answered: “I guess I did.”  The judge asked Reed: “You’re telling me that you spent – [Walker] was staying with you that first weekend in March of 2002.”  Reed answered “Yes.”  On cross-examination, however, she changed her answer as follows:

Q: 2002 is when y’all broke up?

A: Yea.

Q: You know the exact date?

A: No, sir.

Q: But you knew he was with you that night?

A: Huh?

Q: You knew he was with you on March 2?

A: Well, I know he was with me, but I can’t say a particular date.  No, I don’t know what date y’all want.

Q: But you can’t remember the date y’all broke up?

A: Right.

Q: Do you know what you were doing the night of March 1, 2002?

A: No, I can’t go back that far.

Q: Well, that’s just the day before when you said Mr. Walker was with you?

A: You said he was with me, but that’s all I can say.

Q: So, you don’t know what you were doing March 1, 2002?

A: We could have been together in 2002.  I don’t even know what day that was.

Q: But you don’t know specifically?

A: Right, that’s what I’m saying.

Q: But you know specifically right now what you were doing March 2, 2002?

A: No, I ain’t said that.

Q: So, you don’t know what you were doing March 2, 2002 that night?

The Court: Ma’am, do you know whether or not you were with this man over here Mr. Walker?

The Witness: I know we spent a lot of days together.  I can’t tell you no particular day.

Q: So you can’t tell –

A: A particular day; right.

Q: You can’t tell us you were with him March 2, 2002?

A: Right.

As to Reed’s testimony, the PCR court found:

[Walker] and Reed had an intimate relationship that was ongoing at the time of the alleged incident    . . . .  [Reed] further testified that [Walker] was usually with her during the time frame of [the] incident.  [Walker] testified that he had been spending many nights, and most, if not all, weekends with Reed prior to, and including, the date of the alleged incident . . . .  While Reed’s memory of specific dates is not perfect since it has been approximately five years since the incident, and approximately four years since the trial, her testimony corroborated that of [Walker].

. . . [T]he Court finds that the testimony of Reed at the PCR hearing was credible.

The jury would have weighed the credibility of the testimony of the witness, and it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of the deliberations may have been different had this witness testified in light of the facts of this case.

The PCR court granted Walker’s application on two grounds.  First, the court found the failure to investigate the alibi witness was deficient and prejudiced the defense.  Second, the court found Walker independently established a second ground for prejudice with the cumulative effect of Trial Counsel’s error in her failure to investigate [the victim’s] alcohol use, her failure to move to continue the hearing to await the written results of the forensic testing, her failure to cross-examine the witnesses as to the discrepancy of the conflicting times of the incident, and her failure to investigate or interview Reed, the combination of which prejudiced [Walker].

The judge explained that, standing alone, none of the first three instances of deficient performance established prejudice, but when they were added together with the failure to investigate Reed as an alibi witness, “[these] failures cumulatively prejudiced” Walker.  The State appeals both grounds upon which the PCR judge granted the application.[1]

II.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review

To obtain post-conviction relief based on the alleged denial of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the applicant must satisfy the two-prong test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  First, the applicant must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient based on a standard of “‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'”  Edwards v. State, 392 S.C. 449, 456, 710 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  Second, the applicant “must demonstrate that this deficiency prejudiced him to the point that he was deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable.”  Id.  To satisfy this second prong, the applicant “must demonstrate that his attorney’s errors had an effect on the judgment against him.”  392 S.C. at 458-59, 710 S.E.2d at 65.  An error will be found to affect the judgment if the applicant proves “‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'”  392 S.C. at 459, 710 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  “In other words, [the applicant] must show that ‘the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.'”  Id.  (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).

An appellate court must affirm the factual findings of the PCR court if they are supported by any probative evidence in the record. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).  This court “will reverse the PCR court only where there is either no probative evidence to support the decision or the decision was controlled by an error of law.”  Edwards, 392 S.C. at 455, 710 S.E.2d at 64.

III.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Alibi Witness

A.   First Prong of Strickland

We agree with the PCR court’s finding that trial counsel’s failure to investigate Reed as an alibi witness was deficient performance.  Counsel admitted she watched the DVD of Walker’s interview.  Therefore, she was aware of Walker’s claim that he was with Reed on the night of the crime.[2]  “[C]riminal defense attorneys have a duty to undertake a reasonable investigation, which at a minimum includes interviewing potential witnesses and making an independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Edwards, 392 S.C. at 456, 710 S.E.2d at 64.  The duty to investigate a potential witness is even more critical when the witness might provide an alibi.  Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment requires that criminal defense attorneys thoroughly investigate potential alibi witnesses.

Trial counsel did nothing personally to investigate Reed as a witness.  Her claim that her investigator was exploring Reed’s role in the case also does not satisfy her obligations under the Sixth Amendment.  The duty to represent the client belongs to the lawyer.  While it may be reasonable to allow investigators and paralegals to do some or all of the investigatory work, trial counsel has a duty to supervise the investigation, make sure it is completed, and familiarize herself with the results.  Trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate Reed as an alibi witness under the circumstances presented in this case was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and therefore deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment.

The State points out, however, that the defense presented a theory that Walker and the victim had consensual intercourse and there was no rape.  The State argues this was “a far better theory” than an alibi defense because an alibi would not have explained the victim’s detailed and accurate description of Walker’s house and truck.  The State thus argues that trial counsel’s failure to investigate Reed as an alibi witness is justified as a valid strategic decision.  This argument mischaracterizes the role of strategy in the analysis of trial counsel’s performance.  If counsel had properly investigated the alibi defense, and then made an informed strategic decision not to pursue it, the State’s argument would be persuasive.  However, because trial counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation of the alibi defense, she could not have made an informed strategic choice.

In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that

strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.     . . . [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.

466 U.S. at 690-91; see Council v. State, 380 S.C. 159, 175, 670 S.E.2d 356, 364 (2008).  Here, trial counsel articulated no reasonable basis for her decision not to investigate Reed as an alibi witness.  Therefore, reasonable professional judgment does not support the limitation on the investigation.  Moreover, such a decision could not have been reasonable professional judgment.  Because an alibi is a complete defense to a criminal charge,[3] there is no conception of sound judgment that will permit trial counsel to choose not to investigate the testimony of a witness whom counsel has reason to believe could provide an alibi.

We find, therefore, that there is evidence to support the PCR court’s ruling that Walker met the first prong of the Strickland test.  We agree with the court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because we find “‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'”  Edwards, 392 S.C. at 456, 710 S.E.2d at 64 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).

B.  Second Prong of Strickland

As to the second prong of Strickland, however, we find the PCR court’s ruling that trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Walker was controlled by an error of law.  To qualify as an alibi, a witness’s testimony must account for the defendant’s whereabouts during the time of the crime such that it would have been physically impossible for the defendant to commit the crime. Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995).  Reed’s testimony at the PCR hearing did not meet the definition of alibi.  Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to present the testimony cannot form the basis of a finding of prejudice under StricklandGlover, 318 S.C. at 498, 458 S.E.2d at 539-40.

This case is similar to Glover.  There, the PCR applicant “argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contact several witnesses who could have testified [the applicant] was in Florida when the crimes were committed.”  318 S.C. at 497, 458 S.E.2d at 539.  One witness initially said he “believed” the applicant was in Florida, but then said he could not remember and “knew ‘nothing.'”  Id.  The second witness testified the applicant was in Florida eleven hours before the crime was committed at a location only approximately six-and-a-half hours away.  318 S.C. at 497-98, 498 n.1, 458 S.E.2d at 539-40, 540 n.1.  The testimony of either witness would have made it less likely the applicant committed the crime.  Nevertheless, the supreme court found “no evidence to support the PCR judge’s finding of prejudice” because “neither witness’s PCR testimony established an alibi defense.”  318 S.C. at 498, 458 S.E.2d at 539-40.  In support of its finding, the supreme court cited State v. Robbins, 275 S.C. 373, 271 S.E.2d 319 (1980) for the following proposition: “[S]ince an alibi derives its potency as a defense from the fact that it involves the physical impossibility of the accused’s guilt, a purported alibi which leaves it possible for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all.”  Glover, 318 S.C. at 498, 458 S.E.2d at 540.

We interpret Glover to establish a framework for analyzing an alleged failure to investigate an alibi witness.  When a PCR applicant alleges trial counsel failed to investigate or present an alibi witness, the PCR court must make two findings to determine if counsel’s deficient performance constitutes prejudice under Strickland.  First, the court must find as a matter of law whether the witness’s testimony meets the legal definition of an alibi.  Second, the court must assess the witness’s credibility.  In making the first finding, the court must consider the entire record to determine what the testimony would have been if it had been presented at trial.  The PCR court must consider the testimony as a whole, take it as true and credible, and view it in the light most favorable to the PCR applicant.

Analyzing Reed’s testimony under the Glover framework, we conclude her testimony does not qualify as an alibi.  Reed’s testimony makes it less likely Walker is guilty.  Taken as a whole, however, her testimony does not account for Walker’s whereabouts on March 2, 2002, such that it was physically impossible that he committed the crimes.  Although Reed began by saying Walker spent the weekend with her, she eventually said she could not specifically remember whether Walker spent the night with her on March 2.  Even her specific testimony that Walker “was staying with [her] that . . . weekend” does not foreclose the possibility that he arrived at her house on Saturday morning after committing the crimes on Friday night.  Therefore, like the testimony of the two witnesses in Glover, Reed’s testimony does not establish an alibi because it leaves open the possibility that Walker is guilty.[4]

Because Reed’s testimony does not meet the legal definition of an alibi, Walker failed to show a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different if trial counsel investigated and presented Reed’s testimony.  Therefore, the PCR court committed an error of law in finding that Walker satisfied the second prong of the Strickland test.

IV.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Cumulative Prejudice

The PCR court found that trial counsel’s performance was deficient in three additional instances.  The PCR court determined that Walker had not independently met the prejudice prong of the Strickland test as to any one of these deficiencies.  However, the court found that the cumulative effect of the three, combined with the failure to investigate the alibi, did satisfy the prejudice prong.  We disagree.  We find no evidence to support the PCR court’s ruling that two of the instances were deficient performance.  The other instance, which was deficient performance, and the failure to investigate Reed as an alibi witness have no cumulative prejudicial effect.[5]  Therefore, the PCR court erred in granting relief.

A.   Continuance to Await the Written Results of a DNA Test

The PCR court found trial counsel’s performance was deficient because she did not ask for a continuance to wait for the written report from the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division showing that no DNA evidence linked Walker to the crime.  We do not find evidence in the record to support this finding.

SLED tested a “bite mark” with the victim’s blood and found “no DNA profile unlike the victim.”  SLED did not release the written results of this analysis until a month after Walker’s trial.  However, both the assistant solicitor and trial counsel were aware of the test results before trial.  The assistant solicitor testified at the PCR hearing that the verbal SLED report generally becomes available “much earlier” than the written report.  The PCR court found counsel should have sought a continuance to wait for the written SLED report because she “could have shown [the report] to the jury in order to stress that the only evidence linking the Applicant to the incident was [the victim’s] identification.”

First, the victim’s identification of Walker is not the only evidence linking him to the crime.  The victim’s descriptions of Walker’s truck and house were detailed and accurate.  Based on these descriptions, the State was able to argue persuasively that the victim was in Walker’s house.

Moreover, the trial transcript shows that counsel did stress to the jury the results of the DNA test—that no DNA evidence was found linking Walker to the crime.  On direct examination of the police officer assigned to the case, the officer admitted that no DNA evidence was found in Walker’s house or truck.  On cross-examination, the officer admitted that the rape kit was never sent to SLED for DNA testing, he was unable to collect any samples for DNA testing from Walker’s house, and hairs collected from Walker’s car were not sent to SLED.  Accordingly, the SLED report would have been only marginally helpful to Walker because the contents of the report were made known to the jury through the testimony of the officer.  Moreover, the report would have been offered to prove the truth of what is asserted in the report.  Thus, the report would likely have been inadmissible hearsay.  See State v. Jennings, 394 S.C. 473, 479, 716 S.E.2d 91, 94 (2011) (finding portions of a written report constituted inadmissible hearsay).  Trial counsel’s decision not to seek a continuance so that a marginally helpful and probably inadmissible report containing the same information counsel could present to the jury in other forms is not deficient performance.

B.  Cross-Examination of the Victim on Alcohol Use

The nurse who performed the victim’s rape kit noted that the victim told her she planned to attend “ETOH treatment”[6] that week.  The PCR court found trial counsel’s performance deficient because she did not investigate the reference to “ETOH treatment” in the nurse’s notes or the smell of alcohol noted by the police.  The court found trial counsel’s lack of an investigation was deficient because the “only evidence linking [Walker] to [the victim] was [her] identification of [Walker]” and counsel’s failure “prevented the jury from considering [the victim]’s credibility in her identification of [Walker].”  We do not find any evidence in the record to support this finding.

As explained above, there is more evidence linking Walker to the crime than the victim’s identification.  Additionally, the jury was not prevented from considering the victim’s alcohol use on the day of the crime in assessing her credibility.  The record contains several instances of trial counsel bringing the victim’s alcohol use to the jury’s attention.  Counsel asked the victim about beer she drank while at the assailant’s house.  Counsel cross-examined the victim about the rum and coke she drank when she got home on the morning of March 3, 2002.  Counsel cross-examined the victim’s cousin about the victim bringing an alcoholic drink with her to the cousin’s house on March 3.  Finally, counsel mentioned the victim’s alcohol use in her closing argument.  Thus, the trial transcript reflects that trial counsel investigated and brought to the jury’s attention, through cross-examination and in closing argument, the victim’s use of alcohol during and after the incident, allowing the jury to consider how the alcohol could have affected her credibility in identifying Walker.

We recognize that the nurse’s note shows more than merely that the victim drank alcohol during and after the crime.  Rather, the reference to alcohol treatment paints the victim as an alcoholic.  However, evidence that the victim is an alcoholic is not admissible to prove she was intoxicated at a particular time.  See Rule 404(a), SCRE (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.”).  While “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused” is admissible under Rule 404(a)(2) in some circumstances, the victim’s alcoholism is not a pertinent trait of character in this case.  See State v. Mizell, 332 S.C. 273, 278, 504 S.E.2d 338, 341 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]he ‘prevailing view is that only pertinent traits—those involved in the offense charged—are provable.'” (quoting John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 191 (4th ed. 1992))).

Moreover, evidence of the victim’s alcoholism is not admissible under Rule 608(a), SCRE, because it is not evidence of her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.   See Rule 608(a), SCRE (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked . . . subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”); see also State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 34, 538 S.E.2d 248, 255 (2000) (“Narcotics offenses are generally not considered probative of truthfulness.”).  While evidence of a person’s intoxication at a specific point in time may be admissible to show credibility, evidence that a person is an alcoholic is not.

C.  Cross-Examination on Conflicting Evidence as to the Time of the Incident

The PCR court found trial counsel’s performance was deficient because she did not “adequately prepare for trial through her failure to call witnesses” whose testimony would have shown the victim initially stated she was at the BP station at night and then later stated she was there in the afternoon.  The nurse’s report states that the victim said “on 3/2/02 at approx 7PM, she was at a gas station and her car wouldn’t start back up.”  The PCR transcript refers to a police incident report that says the victim recounted she stopped at the BP station “at approximately 8 P.M.”  The videotape from the BP station shows the victim was there at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon.  At trial, she testified she was at the BP station in the afternoon while it was still light outside.  Counsel had both reports in her case file, but did not ask the victim about the conflicting times.  The PCR court found counsel should have explored the discrepancy to place doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the victim accurately identified Walker.  We uphold the PCR court’s finding of deficient performance in this respect because there is evidence in the record to support the finding.

D.  The Cumulative Effect of Counsel’s Deficient Performance

We find two instances of trial counsel’s deficient performance—her failure to investigate Reed as a potential alibi witness and her failure to cross-examine the victim or call witnesses to testify about conflicting evidence as to the time of the incident.  To the extent the failure to investigate Reed as a potential alibi witness caused some prejudice, we have determined the prejudice did not rise to a level warranting relief under Strickland.  As to the failure to bring out the victim’s conflicting statements on the time of the incident, the PCR court found any prejudice resulting from that deficiency did not independently warrant relief under Strickland.  Even if South Carolina did allow PCR based on the cumulative prejudicial effect of two or more instances of deficient performance,[7] Walker would still have to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for [the cumulation of] counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  Edwards, 392 S.C. at 459, 710 S.E.2d at 66 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  We find he has not.  These instances of deficient performance are unrelated to each other and neither one makes the other more prejudicial.  Therefore, even if we could evaluate them together, there is no cumulative prejudicial effect that would warrant relief under Strickland.

V.  Conclusion

The judgment of the PCR court granting a new trial is

REVERSED.

THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] The State also contends the PCR court applied an incorrect standard by requiring counsel to articulate a trial strategy for each alleged instance of deficient performance.  However, we do not read the PCR court’s order to include such a requirement.  We read the order as merely noting that trial counsel did not articulate a strategy in defense of her performance.

[2] Walker never personally told trial counsel about Reed.  However, trial counsel could not have watched the interview without knowing Reed was a potential alibi witness.

[3] See State v. Robbins, 275 S.C. 373, 375, 271 S.E.2d 319, 320 (1980).

[4] Because Reed’s testimony does not meet the legal definition of an alibi, it is not necessary to make the second finding.

[5] “[W]hether the cumulation of several errors, ‘which by themselves are not prejudicial, would warrant relief is an unsettled question in South Carolina.'”  Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 535 n.3, 657 S.E.2d 771, 779 n.3 (2008) (quoting Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 197, 569 S.E.2d 318, 325 (2002)).  As discussed below, we find it unnecessary to answer this question because Walker has failed to prove prejudice under any interpretation of the law.

[6] ETOH is an abbreviation for ethanol and refers to alcohol and alcohol abuse.  Trial counsel knew this.

[7] See footnote 5.

Probation Violation – Required Findings to Revoke

This case demonstrates the critical arguments necessary to win probation violation charges. In these difficult economic times, it may be impossible to pay court costs, fines, and/or restitution. However, having your suspended sentence converted to real time in prison only makes things worse. Better make sure your criminal defense attorney understands the critical rules here and is willing to fight to keep you out of jail and working to support your family.

At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our attorneys have over 70 years of combined trial experience in both civil and criminal courts.  We are available by mobile phone in the evenings, on weekends, and even holidays. Our lawyers are licensed in both South Carolina and North Carolina and are effective criminal trial attorneys.  We are not afraid to go to Court and often do. Tyler Burns is a former 16th Circuit (York County) prosecutor, and Art Aiken is a accomplished criminal attorney who has tried virtually every type of criminal case in both state and federal courts. And, Bea Hightower is a former Richland County public defender in Columbia. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials and experience to any other law firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Phillip Coker, Appellant.


Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge


Opinion No. 4945
Heard January 25, 2012 – Filed February 22, 2012


REVERSED


Appellate Defender Elizabeth A. Franklin-Best and Assistant Appellate Defender Breen Stevens, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

John Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for Respondent.

FEW, C.J.: The circuit court revoked Phillip Coker’s probation based solely on the failure to pay money and imposed a portion of the prison sentence originally suspended.  Coker appeals arguing the circuit court failed to make the necessary findings of fact as to whether the violation was willful.  We agree and reverse.

In Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a court may not revoke probation solely on the basis of the failure to pay money unless the court makes certain findings of fact regarding the willfulness of the failure to pay.  In Barlet v. State, 288 S.C. 481, 343 S.E.2d 620 (1986), our supreme court stated: “Probation may not be revokedsolely on the ground the probationer failed to pay fines or to make restitution.  The judge must determine on the record that the probationer failed to make a bona fide effort to pay.”  288 S.C. at 483, 343 S.E.2d at 622 (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672).

In State v. Spare, 374 S.C. 264, 647 S.E.2d 706 (Ct. App. 2007), we provided the trial bench a roadmap for making the findings required under Bearden and Barlet.  We held the circuit court may not revoke probation solely on the basis of a failure to pay money unless the record reflects the court made the following findings:

(1) “[T]he State has presented sufficient evidence to establish that a probationer has violated the conditions of his probation.”  374 S.C. at 268, 647 S.E.2d at 708 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(2)   “[T]he probationer made a willful choice not to pay” in that the probationer had the funds to pay and chose not to do so or lacked the funds to pay and did not make a bona fide effort to acquire the funds.  374 S.C. at 268-69, 268 n.2, 647 S.E.2d at 708-09, 708 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

(3)  “[I]f the court finds the probationer ‘could not pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so,'” the court may not imprison the probationer unless it also finds that “‘alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in punishment and deterrence.'”  374 S.C. at 268 n.2, 270, 647 S.E.2d at 708 n.2, 709 (quotingBearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 673).

The circuit court did not make any of the required findings in this case.  We therefore reverse and remand to the circuit court with instructions to make the findings required by Spare, along with findings of fact to support each.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.