Mar 28, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, DUI & DWI, News, Nursing Home Abuse, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Workers' Compensation, Wrongful Death
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. And most recently, Mr. Reeves has been included in the SC Super Lawyers for 2012. Below is the review and selection process by which new members are chosen. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the potential criminal, insurance, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We would welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today at 877-374-5999 for a private consultation. Or visit our firm’s website at www.rjrlaw.com.
Super Lawyers Selection Process
Super Lawyers Selection Process Blessed by Courts and Bar Associations Across the Country
Bar associations and courts across the country have recognized the legitimacy of the Super Lawyers selection process. Most recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the findings of a Special Master assigned by the court to, among other things, examine the details of our process. In his July 2008 report, the Special Master lauded our lawyer-rating process, stating:
“[The Super Lawyers selection process] is a comprehensive, good-faith and detailed attempt to produce a list of lawyers that have attained high peer recognition, meet ethical standards, and have demonstrated some degree of achievement in their field.”
“Suffice to say, the selection procedures employed by [Super Lawyers] are very sophisticated, comprehensive and complex.”
“It is absolutely clear from this record that [Super Lawyers does] not permit a lawyer to buy one’s way onto the list, nor is there any requirement for the purchase of any product for inclusion in the lists or any quid pro quo of any kind or nature associated with the evaluation and listing of an attorney or in the subsequent advertising of one’s inclusion in the lists.”
Overview
Super Lawyers selects attorneys using a rigorous, multiphase rating process. Peer nominations and evaluations are combined with third party research. Each candidate is evaluated on 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement. Selections are made on an annual, state-by-state basis.
The objective is to create a credible, comprehensive and diverse listing of outstanding attorneys that can be used as a resource for attorneys and consumers searching for legal counsel. Since Super Lawyers is intended to be used as an aid in selecting a lawyer, we limit the lawyer ratings to those who can be hired and retained by the public, i.e., lawyers in private practice and Legal Aid attorneys.
The Super Lawyers selection process involves three basic steps: creation of the candidate pool; evaluation of candidates by the research department; and peer evaluation by practice area.
Step One: Creation of the Candidate Pool
Lawyers enter the candidate pool by being formally nominated by a peer or if identified by the research department during the research process.
Formal nominations
Once a year, we invite lawyers in each state to nominate the top attorneys they’ve personally observed in action. Lawyers may nominate attorneys in their own firm, but these nominations count only if each in-firm nomination is matched by at least one out-firm nomination.
Each nomination carries a point value. An out-firm nomination has substantially greater point value than an in-firm nomination. Lawyers cannot nominate themselves, and must limit their nominations to others who practice in the same state.
Our procedures and database have several safeguards that prevent lawyers from “gaming” the system. For example, we track who nominates whom. This helps us detect any excessive “back-scratch” nominations (lawyers nominating each other) and “block nominations” (where members of the same law firm all cast identical nominations). We also prohibit lawyers from engaging in “campaigning” or solicitation of nominations from other lawyers.
While important, the nomination phase is simply the first step in our process. It puts lawyers on our radar for further research and evaluation, and awards points in our rating system. But we limit the value of those points so that no matter how many nominations one receives, it will not guarantee selection.
Research process
Our attorney-led research staff searches for lawyers who have attained certain honors, results or credentials, which indicate a high degree of peer recognition or professional competence. For example, certification as a specialist in a particular area of practice, or admission to prestigious colleges or academies, e.g., The American College of Trial Lawyers. The staff identifies these credentials by reviewing a proprietary list of database and online sources, including national and local legal trade publications.
Most of the lawyers we identify in this process have also been nominated by their peers. Occasionally, however, we find outstanding lawyers who have been overlooked in the nomination process. These may include: lawyers with national litigation practices who rarely appear in the courts of their home jurisdiction; lawyers in smaller firms or from smaller communities; and lawyers practicing in less visible or highly specialized practice areas.
Informal nominations
Throughout the year, readers, clients and attorneys who are not eligible to formally nominate (that is, actively licensed to practice in the same state as the nominee) send us names of lawyers we should consider for inclusion. Though no points are awarded, we add these lawyers to the candidate pool for further research and evaluation.
Step Two: Evaluation of Lawyers in Candidate Pool
Our research department evaluates each candidate based on these 12 indicators of peer recognition and professional achievement: verdicts and settlements; transactions; representative clients; experience; honors and awards; special licenses and certifications; position within law firm; bar and or other professional activity; pro bono and community service as a lawyer; scholarly lectures and writings; education and employment background; and other outstanding achievements.
These indicators are not treated equally; some have a higher maximum point value than others.
Step Three: Peer Evaluation by Practice Area
In this step, also known as the “blue ribbon review,” candidates are grouped according to their primary areas of practice. The candidates in each practice area with the highest point totals from steps one and two above are asked to serve on a blue ribbon panel. The panelists are then provided a list of candidates from their practice areas to review, rating them on a scale of one to ten.
Final Selection
Candidates are grouped into four firm-size categories. Those with the highest point totals from each category are selected. This means solo and small firm lawyers are compared with other solo and small firm attorneys, and large firm lawyers compete with other large firm lawyers. Five percent of the total lawyers in the state are selected for inclusion in Super Lawyers.
Before Publishing
The research staff checks each candidate’s standing with the local licensing authority. Each candidate is asked to aver that they have never been subject to disciplinary or criminal proceedings.
Final Internet searches are performed on each candidate to ensure there are no outstanding matters that would reflect adversely on the lawyer. We also contact each lawyer to ensure accuracy of all published information.
Publication
The final published list represents no more than 5 percent of the lawyers in the state. The lists are published annually in state and regional editions of Super Lawyers magazines and in inserts and special advertising sections in leading city and regional magazines and newspapers. All attorneys selected for inclusion in Super Lawyers, regardless of year, can be found on superlawyers.com.
Mar 18, 2012 | Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Workers' Compensation
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our lawyers are experienced workers’ compensation attorneys. Robert J. Reeves is a former intensive care unit Registered Nurse (RN) who has actually treated patients with the same type of serious injuries he now represents in workers’ compensation cases. Both Robert J. Reeves and Arthur K. Aiken are former insurance defense attorneys who know what to anticipate and how to prepare for trial and insurance company tactics. During our twenty-two (22) years each of practicing law, we have handled virtually every type of workers’ compensation injury, including neck, back, shoulder, knee accidents, closed head / brain injury, herniated disks, bulging disks, diskectomy surgery, fusion procedures, arthroscopy, automobile accidents on the job, psychological / post traumatic stress, permanent and total disability claims, and wrongful death. We welcome the opportunity to sit down and personally discuss your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Francis Ike Johnson, Respondent,
v.
Sonoco Products Company and GAB Robins, Inc., Appellants.
Appeal From Darlington County
James E. Lockemy, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 26584
Heard November 19, 2008 – Filed January 20, 2009
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; AND REMANDED
Michael A. Farry and David A. Wilson, both of Horton, Drawdy, Ward & Jenkins, of Greenville, for Appellants.
Vernon F. Dunbar, of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellants Sonoco Products Company and GAB Robins, Inc. (collectively, Sonoco) argue the circuit court erred in granting Respondent Francis Ike Johnson’s motion to compel payment of his workers’ compensation benefits during the pendency of the underlying appeal. We disagree and affirm. We find that the circuit court’s award of workers’ compensation benefits in the underlying appeal was not stayed during the appeal. As a result, we conclude the circuit court retained authority to compel the payment of compensation benefits pursuant to Rule 225(a), SCACR. We further affirm Johnson’s entitlement to interest and related sanctions. We modify the order of the circuit court only insofar as the effective date of Johnson’s entitlement to relief. We remand to the circuit court to calculate Johnson’s entitlement to interest as of June 15, 2005, thirty days following entry of the circuit court order awarding Johnson benefits.
I.
The single commissioner awarded benefits to Johnson. The commission reversed, and Johnson appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the commission and awarded benefits to Johnson. Sonoco’s motion to reconsider was denied, and the circuit court order became final on May 16, 2005.
Sonoco appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. Johnson v. Sonoco Products Co., Op. No. 2006-UP-281 (S.C.Ct.App. filed Sept. 20, 2006). Sonoco unsuccessfully sought rehearing in the Court of Appeals. We subsequently denied Sonoco’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The remittitur was sent to the lower court on June 13, 2007.
Prior to the conclusion of the underlying appeal, Johnson filed a motion to compel payment of the compensation benefits in the circuit court, together with a subsequent motion in the circuit court for sanctions (interest and a ten percent penalty) against Sonoco. Sonoco objected to the jurisdiction of the circuit court on two grounds: (1) the award of workers’ compensation benefits was stayed during the appeal, and (2) absent a remand from the appellate court, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Johnson’s motions. The circuit court rejected Sonoco’s arguments and awarded relief, calculating Johnson’s entitlement to interest as of the date of the single commissioner’s order, May 29, 2002, and assessing a ten percent penalty. The circuit court’s initial order granting relief was filed December 20, 2006, and an amended order was filed on March 6, 2007, following Sonoco’s motion for reconsideration. Sonoco appealed. Thereafter, as noted above, the underlying appeal became final and the remittitur was sent to the lower court.
Following the circuit court order of March 6, 2007, Sonoco paid Johnson his compensation benefits, but continued with the current appeal challenging the award of interest and ten percent penalty. The appeal is before us pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR, certification.
II.
The first issue we must resolve is whether the appeal in the underlying case stayed Sonoco’s responsibility to make weekly compensation payments to Johnson. Rule 225(a), SCACR, provides the general rule that service of a notice of appeal in a civil matter automatically stays matters affected by the appeal. Some of the exceptions to this rule are found in Rule 225(b), which sets forth a non-exhaustive list. Rule 225 expressly provides that exceptions to the general rule extend beyond the list in subsection (b) and are found in statutes, court rules, and case law.
This Court provided such case law when it previously addressed this issue of whether an award of workers’ compensation benefits by the circuit court would be stayed by the service of the notice of appeal in Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 236 S.C. 515, 534, 115 S.E.2d 57, 67-68 (1960). In Hermitage this Court stated:
[I]f the Commission should deny him compensation and upon his appeal the circuit court should reverse the Commission and hold his claim compensable, the weekly payments to be made by the employer pending determination of an appeal from that judgment to the Supreme Court should commence from the date of the circuit court’s judgment and should not be calculated retroactively from the date of the Commission’s decision.
Id. In making this determination, this Court interpreted section 72-356 of the South Carolina Code (1952). Hermitage, 236 S.C. at 534, 115 S.E.2d at 67. This section is substantially similar to section 42-17-60 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007). We hold that the rule in Hermitage is on point. Therefore, when the commission’s denial of benefits is reversed and the award is made by the circuit court, the weekly payments are not stayed by the appeal.[1]
We further note that we have already made such a ruling in this case. In an order issued by this Court on November 14, 2006, this Court granted Sonoco’s motion for an extension of time to file its petition for certiorari, and we specifically stated that the award of benefits to Johnson “is not stayed by the pendency of this matter.” This Court went on to cite section 42-17-60; Rule 225, SCACR;Hermitage, 236 S.C. 515, 115 S.E.2d 57; and McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., 280 S.C. 466, 313 S.E.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1984).
We next turn to the authority of the circuit court to compel, in the absence of a remand order, the weekly payments during the pendency of the appeal. The answer is unambiguously provided in Rule 225(a), SCACR, which states, “[t]he lower court . . . retains jurisdiction over matters not affected by the appeal including the authority to enforce matters not stayed by the appeal.” (emphasis added). The circuit court retained authority to compel the payment of weekly benefits, and Sonoco’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. No remand from the appellate court was necessary. Moreover, because the awards of interest and penalty are inextricably linked to Sonoco’s nonpayment of benefits, we follow the rationale of Hermitage and hold that the matters of interest and penalty were not stayed by the appeal.
Sonoco further challenges the authority of the circuit court to award interest and assess the ten percent penalty under section 42-9-90 of the South Carolina Code (1976). Sonoco contends such an award rests exclusively in the Workers’ Compensation Commission. We find this issue is not preserved. The issue first appears in Sonoco’s motion seeking reconsideration of the circuit court’s December 20, 2006 order. An issue may not be raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Riddle, 334 S.C. 176, 186, 512 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Further, because the transcript of the proceedings below is omitted from the record, it appears the first time Commercial Credit made this argument was in its Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, this issue is not properly preserved for our review.”). The matters of interest and the ten percent penalty were squarely before the circuit court, and Sonoco’s pre-hearing written responses to Johnson’s motions did not raise the section 42-9-90 challenge. Moreover, the transcript of the hearing in the circuit court is not included in the record on appeal. Medlock v. One 1985 Jeep Cherokee VIN 1JCWB7828FT129001, 322 S.C. 127, 132, 470 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1996) (“The appellant has the burden of providing this court with a sufficient record upon which to make a decision.”); Smith v. Ridgeway Chemicals, Inc., 302 S.C. 303, 306, 395 S.E.2d 742, 744 (Ct. App. 1990) (“It is incumbent upon an appellant to present a record sufficient to permit a review of a trial judge’s rulings.”). We therefore affirm the awards of interest and ten percent penalty. Johnson is additionally entitled to interest on the ten percent penalty.
We do agree with Sonoco’s final assignment of error that Johnson is not entitled to interest from the date of the single commissioner’s order. We are guided by the reasoning of Hermitage. 236 S.C. at 534, 115 S.E.2d at 67-68 (“[U]pon his appeal [if] the circuit court should reverse the Commission and hold his claim compensable, the weekly payments to be made by the employer pending determination of an appeal from that judgment to the Supreme Court should commence from the date of the circuit court’s judgment and should not be calculated retroactively from the date of the Commission’s decision.”). This Court in Hermitage cited to section 72-356 of the South Carolina Code (1952) in referencing a thirty-day supersedeas on appeals from an award of benefits. Id.
Section 72-356 is the predecessor to section 42-17-60 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2007). The thirty-day time period for appeals remains a part of section 42-17-60, with the provision that “after that time, the employer is required to make weekly payments of compensation and to provide medical treatment ordered . . . .” Because the commission denied Johnson’s claim and the circuit court awarded benefits, we apply this statutory thirty-day supersedeas following the entry of the circuit court order, after which the compensation payments should have been made. There was no legitimate reason to justify or excuse Sonoco’s failure to pay compensation benefits to Johnson during the pendency of the underlying appeal. Johnson is therefore entitled to an award of interest calculated from June 15, 2005, which is thirty days from the award of benefits in the circuit court. We remand to the circuit court for the sole purpose of calculating the interest due Johnson.
III.
The award of workers’ compensation benefits by the circuit court was not stayed by the appeal. Pursuant to Rule 225(a), the circuit court had jurisdiction to compel the payment of benefits, as well as interest and penalty, during the pendency of the appeal. We affirm the circuit court in its entirety, save the effective date of the award of interest. The matter is remanded to the circuit court to calculate the award of interest calculated from June 15, 2005.[2]
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; AND REMANDED.
TOAL, C.J., WALLER, BEATTY, KITTREDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice James E. Moore, concur.
[1] We recognize the procedure followed in this case has been statutorily modified. For injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2007, appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Commission go directly from the commission to the Court of Appeals. See Act 111, 2007 S.C. Acts 111.
[2] The principle payment of the ten percent penalty ($20,513) should be made promptly. Moreover, the parties can compute the amount of interest due Johnson, and we urge the parties, through counsel, to do so and bring this unreasonably protracted litigation to an end. The circuit court should not be further burdened with this unnecessary litigation.
Mar 17, 2012 | Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Workers' Compensation
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our lawyers are experienced workers’ compensation attorneys. Robert J. Reeves is a former intensive care unit Registered Nurse (RN) who has actually treated patients with the same type of serious injuries he now represents in workers’ compensation cases. Both Robert J. Reeves and Arthur K. Aiken are former insurance defense attorneys who know what to anticipate and how to prepare for trial and insurance company tactics. During our twenty-two (22) years each of practicing law, we have handled virtually every type of workers’ compensation injury, including neck, back, shoulder, knee accidents, closed head / brain injury, herniated disks, bulging disks, diskectomy surgery, fusion procedures, arthroscopy, automobile accidents on the job, psychological / post traumatic stress, permanent and total disability claims, and wrongful death. We welcome the opportunity to sit down and personally discuss your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other firm. Then call us at 803-548-4444 for a private consultation. Or visit our firm’s website at www.rjrlaw.com.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
Marsha Tennant, Petitioner,
v.
Beaufort County School District, Employer, and S.C. School Board Insurance Trust, Carrier, of whom Beaufort County School District is Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appeal from Beaufort County
Curtis L. Coltrane, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 26616
Heard January 7, 2009 – Filed March 16, 2009
AFFIRMED
James H. Moss, Esquire and H. Fred Kuhn, both of Moss, Kuhn & Fleming, of Beaufort, for Petitioner.
Kirsten L. Barr, Jamie C. Guerrero, and Kathryn C. Thompson, all of Trask and Howell, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondent.
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: In this workers’ compensation case, the single commissioner denied benefits, and the full commission, the circuit court, and the court of appeals affirmed. Tennant v. Beaufort County Sch. Dist. Op. No. 2007-UP-056 (S.C. Ct. App. filed February 8, 2007). This Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision. We affirm.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Marsha Tennant worked as a special education teacher for thirty years prior to working for Respondent in that same role. In the fall of 2001, after being employed for approximately one year with Respondent, two new aides were assigned to assist Petitioner with her students in the classroom. As the year progressed, Petitioner was concerned that the aides were not performing their job in violation of federal Individualized Education Programs regulations and worried that the aides’ performances would jeopardize the education program. Both Petitioner and the aides complained to the supervisor.
On October 18, 2001, after an argument with the aides, Tennant felt faint and went to the nurse’s office, where the nurse recorded Petitioner’s blood pressure as elevated. Petitioner later returned to the nurse’s office complaining of chest pains and dizziness. The nurse recorded a higher blood pressure and called an ambulance. The emergency room doctor diagnosed Petitioner with a stress reaction.
At the hearing, Petitioner’s family doctor (“Family Doctor”) testified that Petitioner suffered a panic attack that was caused by work conditions and diagnosed Petitioner with “situational depression and panic disorder.” Additionally, Petitioner submitted the deposition testimony of a licensed social worker (“Sociologist”) who began treating Petitioner at her psychotherapy practice after the anxiety attack. Sociologist diagnosed Petitioner with post traumatic stress disorder and continued panic attacks and concluded that Petitioner should not return to work as a special education teacher. Respondent submitted a letter from a psychiatrist (“Psychiatrist”) who evaluated Petitioner. She concluded that Petitioner suffered a single anxiety attack, but that Petitioner did not require additional medical treatment and could return to work.
The single commissioner found that Petitioner failed to prove that the conditions of her employment were either extraordinary or unusual. Additionally, the single commissioner gave greater weight to the testimony of Psychiatrist than to the testimonies of Family Doctor and Sociologist and ruled that Sociologist was not qualified to render an opinion on causation under South Carolina case law. The full commission ruled that Sociologist’s testimony should be made a part of the record, but affirmed the denial of benefits. The circuit court and the court of appeals found that substantial evidence in the record supported a finding that Petitioner did not suffer a compensable injury, and therefore, affirmed the full commission’s decision.
We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision, and Petitioner presents the following issue for review:
Did the court of appeals err in affirming the order denying benefits because the full commission’s decision is not support by substantial evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court must affirm the findings of fact made by the full commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981). Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached. Tiller v. Nat’l Health Care Ctr., 334 S.C. 333, 338, 513 S.E.2d 843, 845 (1999).
LAW/ANALYSIS
Petitioner argues that the court of appeals erred in affirming the full commission’s finding that she did not suffer a compensable injury. We disagree.
In order to recover for mental injuries caused solely by emotional stress, or “mental-mental” injuries, the claimant must show that she was exposed to unusual and extraordinary conditions in her employment and that these unusual and extraordinary conditions were the proximate cause of the mental disorder. Powell v. Vulcan Materials Co., 299 S.C. 325, 384 S.E.2d 725 (1989). This standard, also known as the “heart attack standard,” balances the employee’s interests with the employer’s interests and provides a framework which ensures that the claimant shows that she suffered a work-related injury. Requiring a claimant to prove exposure to “unusual or extraordinary” circumstances in a mental-mental injury claim is consistent with the heightened burden required to prove a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, a cause of action that also allows recovery for mental injuries in the absence of physical injury. See Hasson v. Scalise Builders of South Carolina, 374 S.C. 352, 356, 650 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2007), quoting Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 166, 276 S.E.2d 776, 780 (1981) (recognizing that “where physical harm is lacking, the courts should look initially for more in the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental disturbance claimed is not fictitious”).
In the instant case, Petitioner alleges that the aides’ insubordination created the unusual and extraordinary conditions, which caused her panic attack. Petitioner testified that the aides would walk out of the classroom and refused to escort the children to the bathroom and that several of her students regressed in their progress as a result of the aides’ actions. She also testified that she reported her concerns to her supervisor, but the supervisor sided with the aides and would not help her.
We find substantial evidence in the record supports the full commission’s findings. Although the conflict may have been stressful, it was not an unusual or extraordinary circumstance of Petitioner’s employment. Neither the aides nor Petitioner’s supervisor threatened her, and the conflict never involved physical contact. Petitioner admits that a special education teacher is an inherently stressful job, and Social Worker conceded that a panic attack may be triggered absent unusual or extraordinary circumstances. Additionally, Petitioner’s supervisor testified that conflicts like the one between Petitioner and the aides were not unusual. In our view, cases in which the Court has found unusual and extraordinary circumstances that resulted in a mental injury involve much more extreme and severe facts. See Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) (finding the combination of death threats, gun incidents with violent drug dealers, high tension confrontations, fear of being uncovered, and loss of security as a police officer constituted unusual or extraordinary conditions of employment when they occur over several months);Stokes v. First Nat. Bank, 306 S.C. 46, 50, 410 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1991) (concluding that the extreme prolonged increase in employee’s work hours, combined with additional job responsibilities, constituted unusual and extraordinary conditions of employment); Powell, 299 S.C. at 328, 384 S.E.2d at 727 (holding that an intense verbal exchange between the employee and the supervisor constituted unusual and extraordinary condition of employee’s work).
Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence in the record exists to support the commission’s decision that Petitioner failed to meet her burden that she suffered a compensable injury.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision upholding the denial of benefits.
WALLER, PLEICONES, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
