Feb 25, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized
This recent SC Supreme Court case discusses whether a city or municipality can basically exempt itself from a State law. In this matter, the issue is helmet laws for motorcyclists. Regardless of the outcome of this decision, it raises the controversial topic of whether motorcycle riders should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to wear protective helmets. We all know the safety issues and injury concerns. However, most motorcycle riders are fiercely independent thinkers and want to experience the freedom that only riding a motorcycle on an open road provides. It is an even more intimate experience with the road than riding in a convertible. We support a rider’s choice. While we know the potential consequences and represent injured parties in motorcycle accident cases, we still believe in the individual and our right to be free.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they collectively understand the potential criminal, insurance, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
George Jensen Aakjer, III,
Leight Andersen, Bobby
Wayne Archer, Donald Lee
Ard, Gary Philip Balcom,
Thurman Odell Barnes, Ralph
Hillary Bell, Jr., Marvin Simon
Beverly, Steven M. Brinsfield,
Laurie Ann Dzerwieniec,
Jeffery Jay Galbrath, Ronald
Dewayne Gause, Gwendolyn
Marie Harvey, Jessica Jane
Hayes, Anthony Odell Hyman,
Molly Infield, Mark Dale
Infield, Bonnie Roberts
Johnson, Emmett Earl Jones,
Dawn Michell Kelly, Richard
Allen Lester, Rodney Alan
Louhoff, Gary Edward Matson,
Carla Williams Mercer,
Richard O’Neil Mercer, Edward
Dee Mitchum, Kathy Mitchum,
Carol Justice North, Carol
O’Day, William O’Day, III,
Paul David Pinette, Steve
Pinnell, Robert George Pinto,
Debra A. Purcell, Rhonda
Delette Robinson, Scott Allen
Robinson, Rebecca Ann
Rowan, Scott Rowan, Joseph
Fred Ruddock, Jr., David
Francis Speck, Anita Lynn
Teachey, Robert Larry
Thompson, Waddell H.
Thompson, Michael James
Timm, Debbie Timm, Rebel
JM Tyler, Janice Waites, Susan
Wall, and Edward Lucas Williams, Petitioners,
v.
City of Myrtle Beach, City of Myrtle Beach Municipal Court, Respondents.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Opinion No. 26825
Heard February 3, 2010 – Filed June 8, 2010
JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONERS
Desa Ballard, of West Columbia, and James Thomas McGrath, of Richmond, Virginia, for Petitioners.
Michael W. Battle, of Battle, Vaught & Howe, of Conway, for Respondents.
JUSTICE PLEICONES: In response to various concerns stemming from motorcycle rallies, the City of Myrtle Beach enacted a number of ordinances and amendments to ordinances (the Motorcycle Ordinances). Among the ordinances was Ordinance 2008-64, which required that any person riding a motorcycle wear a protective helmet and eyewear (the Helmet Ordinance). Petitioners were each cited for violating the Helmet Ordinance by failing to wear the requisite helmet and eyewear. They brought this action in this Court’s original jurisdiction challenging the Helmet Ordinance on three points: (1) the Helmet Ordinance is preempted by State law; (2) the ordinance establishing the system for adjudicating infractions of the Helmet Ordinance, which has since been repealed, was so intertwined with certain Motorcycle Ordinances that its repeal caused the ordinances to fail[1]; and, (3) the current system for adjudicating alleged violations of the Helmet Ordinance in municipal court is improper as the municipal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the charges.
Petitioners seek a declaratory judgment finding the Helmet Ordinance and Motorcycle Ordinances invalid and a writ of prohibition barring the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the alleged violations of the Helmet Ordinance. We find: (1) that the Helmet Ordinance is preempted under the doctrine of implied field preemption; (2) that the Motorcycle Ordinances were impliedly repealed by the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system; and, (3) since we invalidate the Helmet Ordinance, we do not reach Petitioners’ argument seeking a writ of prohibition.
FACTS
For years, large motorcycle rallies were held in Myrtle Beach. A number of objections were had to the rallies based on, among other things, loud noise and rowdy behavior. Additionally, there was evidence the rallies placed a heavy burden on the local medical community, police, and other emergency responders.
In response, the City passed a number of ordinances and amendments dealing with rallies and motorcycles. Included among them was the Helmet Ordinance, an ordinance requiring all persons riding on motorcycles to wear approved helmets and eyewear. Under the language of the Helmet Ordinance, a violation was deemed an “administrative infraction.” The City passed an ordinance establishing an administrative hearing system to conduct hearings on citations charging violations of certain municipal ordinances, including certain Motorcycle Ordinances. The administrative hearing ordinance was subsequently repealed.
Petitioners were each cited for failing to wear the requisite helmet and eyewear in the City. After the administrative hearing system was repealed, the City issued a Uniform Ordinance Summons for each person charged, requiring them to appear before a municipal court judge. This Court accepted Petitioners’ petition for certiorari in its original jurisdiction before any charges were adjudicated.
ISSUES
| I. |
Is the Myrtle Beach Helmet Ordinance preempted by State law? |
| II. |
Are the Motorcycle Ordinances impliedly repealed? |
DISCUSSION
I. Preemption
A municipal ordinance is a legislative enactment and is presumed to be constitutional. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 285 S.C. 495, 497, 331 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1985). The burden of proving the invalidity of a municipal ordinance is on the party attacking it. Id. This State’s constitution provides that the powers of local governments should be liberally construed. See S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 17.
To determine the validity of a local ordinance, this Court’s inquiry is twofold: (1) did the local government have the power to enact the local ordinance, and if so (2) is the ordinance consistent with the constitution and general law of this State. See Beachfront Entertainment, Inc., v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, 379 S.C. 602, 605, 666 S.E.2d 912, 913 (2008). Petitioners advance a number of grounds for preemption of the Helmet Ordinance. We hold that the Helmet Ordinance fails under the doctrine of implied field preemption.
An ordinance is preempted under implied field preemption when the state statutory scheme so thoroughly and pervasively covers the subject as to occupy the field or when the subject mandates statewide uniformity. See South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Jasper County, 368 S.C. 388, 397, 629 S.E.2d 624, 628 (2006). The General Assembly addressed motorcycle helmet and eyewear requirements in S.C. Code Ann. §§ 56-5-3660 and 56-5-3670 (2009), respectively. The statutes generally require all riders under age twenty-one to wear a protective helmet and utilize protective goggles or a face shield. The Helmet Ordinance, in contrast, requires all riders, regardless of age, to wear a helmet and eyewear.
In S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-30 (2009) the General Assembly authorized local authorities to act in the field of traffic regulation if the ordinance does not conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Traffic Act. Even assuming, as the City contends, that the Helmet Ordinance does not conflict with the Uniform Traffic Act, we find that the ordinance may not stand as the need for uniformity is plainly evident in the regulation of motorcycle helmets and eyewear. Were local authorities allowed to enforce individual helmet ordinances, riders would need to familiarize themselves with the various ordinances in advance of a trip, so as to ensure compliance. Riders opting not to wear helmets or eyewear in other areas of the state would be obliged to carry the equipment with them if they intended to pass through a city with a helmet ordinance. Moreover, local authorities might enact ordinances imposing additional and even conflicting equipment requirements. Such burdens would unduly limit a citizen’s freedom of movement throughout the State. Consequently, the Helmet Ordinance must fail under the doctrine of implied preemption.[2]
II. Implied Repeal
As noted above, the City initially sought to enforce the Motorcycle Ordinances, including the Helmet Ordinance, in an administrative hearing tribunal, but later repealed the ordinance establishing the system. Petitioners contend the City’s enactment of the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system caused the entire Motorcycle Ordinance scheme to fail.[3] We agree.
In general, repeal by implication is disfavored, and is found only when two statutes are incapable of any reasonable reconcilement. See Capco of Summerville, Inc. v. J.H. Gayle Const. Co., Inc., 368 S.C. 137, 141, 628 S.E.2d 38, 41 (2006). “The repugnancy must be plain, and if the two provisions can be construed so that both can stand, a court shall so construe them.” Spectre, LLC v. South Carolina Dep’t of Health and Envtl. Control, 386 S.C. 357, 372, 688 S.E.2d 844, 852 (2010). When two statutes “are incapable of reasonable reconcilement, the last statute passed will prevail, so as to impliedly repeal the earlier statute to the extent of the repugnancy.” See Chris J. Yahnis Coastal, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 295 S.C. 243, 247, 368 S.E.2d 64, 66 (1988).
As noted, the City of Myrtle Beach enacted a number of ordinances and amendments to ordinances in response to the motorcycle rallies. Among the ordinances were ordinances 2008-61 through 67, which the City passed with the designation that any violation constituted an “administrative infraction.” The City also enacted Ordinance 2008-71, establishing an administrative hearing system which, as the City explained on its website, established a process “to handle infractions as specified in Ordinances 2008-61, 2008-62, 2008-63, 2008-64, 2008-65, 2008-66, and 2008-67.” Ordinance 2008-71 set forth in detail the rules, powers, and procedures of the administrative hearing system.
We find that the above-cited ordinances were enacted with the specific condition that they be enforced in the specially-crafted administrative hearing system. The ordinances therefore cannot be reconciled with a later ordinance abolishing the system. Consequently, the Motorcycle Ordinances continuing to reference “administrative infractions” were impliedly repealed.
We note, however, that in the same ordinance which repealed the administrative hearing system, the City amended Ordinances 2008-61 (accommodations restrictions) and 2008-65 (parking of trailers on public streets or unlicensed private lots) to designate those violations as “misdemeanors” rather than “administrative infractions.” Consequently, these ordinances are not impliedly repealed and remain in effect.
CONCLUSION
We find that the City Helmet Ordinance fails under implied field preemption due to the need for statewide uniformity and therefore issue a declaratory judgment invalidating the ordinance. Moreover, we hold that certain Motorcycle Ordinances were impliedly repealed by the ordinance repealing the administrative hearing system.
JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONERS.
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.
[1] Petitioners contend the following ordinances were invalidated by repeal of the ordinance establishing the administrative hearing system: 2008-61 (accommodations restrictions); 2008-62 (consumption and open possession of alcohol in parking areas); 2008-63 (use of parking lots for non-parking activities); 2008-64 (helmet and eyewear requirements for cycles and mopeds); 2008-65 (parking of trailers on public streets or unlicensed private lots); 2008-66 (convenience store and premises security); and 2008-67 (minor or juvenile curfew).
[2]Because we find that the Helmet Ordinance fails under implied field preemption, we need not reach Petitioners’ remaining preemption issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (appellate court need not discuss remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive). Additionally, we need not address Petitioners’ request for a writ of prohibition barring the municipal court from exercising jurisdiction over the alleged ordinance violations. See Sangamo Weston, Inc. v. National Surety Corp., 307 S.C. 143, 148, 414 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1992) (“This court will not issue advisory opinions . . . .”).
[3] Though Petitioners phrase their argument as whether the administrative hearing ordinance is “severable” from the Motorcycle Ordinances, Petitioners actually argue implied repeal.
Feb 25, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Workers' Compensation
This recent SC Court of Appeals cases discusses the critical difference between a physical brain injury (which entitles an injured worker to both lifetime weekly checks and causally related medical treatment) and cognitive deficits resulting from a closed head injury. Both types of injuries constitute the most serious and complex type of workers’ compensation case. However, short of a penetrating wound into the brain, these cases are often very difficult to prove. Brain injury cases can be quite latent. There may not even be distinquishable changes reflected on CT scans, MRI, or EEG testing. In many cases, attorneys rely on psychological and/or neurological testing to show the full effects of a head injury claim. Loss of short-term or long-term memory, mood changes, inability to focus or concentrate, and debilitating headaches are signs that a permanent head injury has occurred. Given the medical issues involved, lawyers usually consult with specialists who can explain and differentiate injury related symptoms versus age related or previous psychological conditions that may have been present. Better make sure your attorney is experienced in this area. Especially in closed head / brain injury cases, there is simply too much at stake for you and your family to risk an inexperienced lawyer.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower LLP, our lawyers are experienced workers’ compensation attorneys. Robert J. Reeves is a former intensive care unit Registered Nurse (RN) who has actually treated patients with the same type of serious injuries he now represents in workers’ compensation cases. Both Robert J. Reeves and Arthur K. Aiken are former insurance defense attorneys who know what to anticipate and how to prepare for trial and insurance company tactics. During our twenty-two (22) years each of practicing law, we have handled virtually every type of workers’ compensation injury, including neck, back, shoulder, knee accidents, closed head / brain injury, herniated disks, bulging disks, diskectomy surgery, fusion procedures, arthroscopy, automobile accidents on the job, psychological / post traumatic stress, permanent and total disability claims, and wrongful death. We welcome the opportunity to sit down and personally discuss your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other firm. Then call us for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Michael D. Crisp, Jr., Employee, Respondent,
v.
SouthCo. Inc., Employer, and Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., Carrier, Appellants.
Appeal From Spartanburg County
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 4746
Heard June 23, 2010 – Filed September 29, 2010
REVERSED
Vernon F. Dunbar, of Greenville, for Appellants.
Kathryn Williams, of Greenville, for Respondent.
WILLIAMS, J.: In this workers’ compensation case, SouthCo. Inc. (SouthCo.) argues the circuit court erred in its capacity as an appellate court by reversing the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s (Commission) finding that Michael Crisp (Crisp) did not sustain a physical brain injury. We agree and reverse.
FACTS
Crisp was an employee of SouthCo., a grassing and seeding company. On March 10, 2004, Crisp was assisting his coworkers in installing an erosion control fence. The installation of the fence required a Bobcat earthmover bucket to press poles into the ground. While Crisp was erecting a pole, the Bobcat bucket detached and struck Crisp’s head, neck, back, and right upper extremity. Crisp was admitted to Mary Black Memorial Hospital (the hospital) and was treated for abrasions and bruises behind the back of his head and neck as well as injuries to his back and right hand. Additionally, Crisp sustained fractures to his third and fourth metacarpal bones in his right hand. On March 17, 2004, Dr. James Essman performed surgery on the fractures. Following surgery, Crisp sought medical treatment from several physicians regarding his headaches and neck and lower back pain.
Dr. J. Hunter Leigh, a physician with Mountain View Family Practice, evaluated Crisp on March 26 and April 8, 2004 and diagnosed Crisp with cervical muscle strain and fractures to his right hand. Dr. John Klekamp, a physician with Piedmont Orthopaedic Associates, evaluated Crisp on April 16, June 2, and July 7, 2004, and diagnosed Crisp with cervical and lumbar strain and fractures to his right hand.
Dr. Kevin Kopera, a physician with the Center for Health and Occupational Evaluation, evaluated Crisp on August 12, September 2, September 23, and October 8, 2004. Dr. Kopera concluded Crisp appeared to be neurologically intact but ordered a MRI scan of Crisp’s brain. The MRI scan did not reveal any abnormalities.
Dr. Robert Moss, a psychologist, conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Crisp on April 12-13, 2005. Dr. Moss noted,
On the basis of the current examination, there are clear indications of deficits in verbal memory, attention, problem solving, and inhibition tied to his work injury. There are indications that he has likely experienced personality changes as a result of his injury. . . . Mr. Crisp is experiencing psychological distress from his injury as well. The exacerbation of obsessive-compulsive tendencies can also be associated with brain injuries involving the orbito-frontal area. This area is often affected in head injury cases due to the irregular shape of the skull and olfaction is often affected since the olfactory bulbs are there. The current findings would be consistent with a frontal lobe injury.
Dr. Moss diagnosed Crisp with the following conditions: cognitive disorder not otherwise specified, probable personality change due to head injury, exacerbation of obsessive-compulsive tendencies, traumatic brain injury consistent with a frontal lobe injury, and poly-substance abuse in full sustained remission. Additionally, Dr. Moss concluded Crisp could benefit from a brain injury program.
On May 24, 2005, Dr. Thomas Collings, a neurologist, diagnosed Crisp with a closed head injury. According to Dr. Collings, a closed head injury consists of “trauma to the brain in a global way as opposed to being a focal area of the brain and . . . causes symptoms in . . . higher competent motions.” Dr. Collings asserted Crisp’s head injury appeared to be “very minor,” and Crisp did not sustain a significant head injury based on his medical records and the low frequency of headache complaints.
Dr. Collings also stated that he significantly relied on Dr. Moss’ neuropsychological report, even though there were some inconsistent findings compared to Crisp’s medical records and his personal observations. However, Dr. Collings concluded Dr. Moss’ report should be followed to ascertain what happened to Crisp and to monitor his underlying psychiatric and substance abuse problems.
Dr. David Price, a psychologist and adjunct associate professor with the Medical University of South Carolina Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences and the University of South Carolina Upstate Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences, concluded there was no credible evidence that Crisp sustained a brain injury. Dr. Price noted there was “no objective medical evidence of a brain injury such as an abnormal CT scan, MRI, or EEG” and asserted Crisp suffered from Substance-Induced Persisting Dementia. Dr. Price diagnosed Crisp with the following conditions: obsessive-compulsive disorder, antisocial personality disorder, partner relational problem, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and phase of life problem. The Commission concluded Dr. Moss’ expert report and opinions were more credible than Dr. Price’s report.
The Workers’ Compensation Commissioner (Commissioner) concluded Crisp sustained a head injury resulting in cognitive disorders to his brain but not a physical brain injury. The Commission affirmed the Commissioner’s order in its entirety. The circuit court reversed the Commission’s ruling and concluded Crisp sustained a physical brain injury.[1] This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard of review for decisions by the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Commission. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 135, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). The Commission is the ultimate fact finder in workers’ compensation cases and is not bound by the single commissioner’s findings of fact. Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 454, 562 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2002). The findings of the Commission are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Lark, 276 S.C. at 135, 276 S.E.2d at 306. Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence that, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action. Taylor v. S.C. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 368 S.C. 33, 36, 627 S.E.2d 751, 752 (Ct. App. 2006).
LAW/ANALYSIS
SouthCo. argues the circuit court erred in reversing the Commission’s decision because substantial evidence existed to support the Commission’s finding that Crisp did not sustain a physical brain injury. We agree.
In reversing the Commission, the circuit court’s order stated,
From the foregoing, it is apparent the Commission made findings consistent with all of the symptoms and conditions on which Dr. Moss made his diagnosis of traumatic brain injury and physical brain damage, including chronic headaches, mild verbal memory problems, attention and concentration problems, problem solving and inhibition problems, probable personality change due to head injury, exacerbation of obsessive-compulsive tendencies, decrease in the sense of smell, frontal lobe brain injury, traumatic closed head injury, and Cognitive Disorder [not otherwise specified] . . . . Nevertheless, despite finding Dr. Moss credible, adopting the findings of brain injury related symptoms and conditions that he used to diagnose frontal lobe brain injury and physical brain damage, and awarding treatment in a “brain injury program” he recommended, the Commission determined that [Crisp] had not sustained physical brain injury. That conclusion contradicts the Commission’s findings of brain injury related conditions, such as Cognitive Disorder [not otherwise specified], and is clearly erroneous. The Commission rejected the other expert’s report, so there is no credible evidence on the record on which the Commission can base its finding that claimant did not sustain physical brain damage.
Therefore, because the only evidence on the record is that [Crisp] has sustained frontal lobe brain injury and physical brain damage, it is the determination of this Court that the Commission’s finding to the contrary is erroneous, is not supported by substantial evidence, and is reversed. Furthermore, since the only conclusion that can be reached on this evidence is that [Crisp] has sustained frontal lobe brain injury and physical brain damage, this Court finds as a matter of law that [Crisp] has sustained physical brain damage within the meaning of the Act.
To the contrary, we conclude the record is replete with substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Crisp did not sustain a physical brain injury based on Dr. Collings’ testimony and the medical records of Crisp’s physicians.
The medical records of the several physicians who treated Crisp following the accident support reversal of the circuit court’s decision. The hospital’s physicians did not note any symptoms commonly attendant to a physical brain injury during Crisp’s treatment. The physicians who evaluated Crisp following surgery did not diagnose Crisp with a physical brain injury. In fact, Dr. Kopera’s MRI scan did not reveal any abnormalities suggestive of a physical brain injury and specifically opined Crisp was neurologically intact.
Furthermore Dr. Collings testified,
What’s missing to me and what was missing when I examined him myself and tried to elicit this history is he doesn’t seem to recall being hit in the head. He wasn’t complaining of head trauma or pain at the time. He was not aware that he had a cut on the head. It was only when someone else was pointing out to him and he was not immediately but very briefly able to get up and run after the accident and was concerned about his hands. All of those things stand in contrast to someone who should’ve had a significant head injury. Usually when people have a significant head injury, closed head injury, they’re knocked out. They’re unconscious for a period of time and then they’re confused when they wake up from that and they’re often unable to get up and would be ataxic or have [no] control of their balance and so forth. All of these things are lacking in that report. Did he have a head injury? Yes, he had some type of head injury but it appears from the records to be very minor.
Moreover, Dr. Collings testified that Crisp’s headaches were not a “big part of the problem” during his evaluation and his headaches were “out of character” and “out of severity” for a significant head injury stemming from the accident. Specifically, Dr. Collings stated,
[T]he fact that [the headaches are] missing in the record and only occasionally he has chronic pain in his neck here but only occasional headaches implies that he wasn’t complaining a lot about headaches or seeking medication or seeking treatment. I find that all unusual if he has a significant head injury.
Dr. Collings further concluded he had “great difficulty in finding any evidence to support [a physical brain injury entitling Crisp to lifetime indemnity benefits],” in the absence of Dr. Moss’ report and a vocational evaluation which stated that Crisp was not employable.
Even though the record presents conflicting evidence on the issue of whether Crisp suffered a physical brain injury, we conclude the circuit court erred in reversing the Commission. See Pack v. State Dep’t. of Transp., 381 S.C. 526, 536, 673 S.E.2d 461, 466 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating where there are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the Commission are conclusive); Taylor, 368 S.C. at 36, 627 S.E.2d at 752 (stating evidence is substantial if, considering the record as a whole, it “would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative agency reached in order to justify its action”); Rogers v. Kunja Knitting Mills, Inc., 312 S.C. 377, 381, 440 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding the circuit court’s reversal of the Commission was error because although the evidence conflicted, the Commission’s findings were supported by substantial evidence).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the circuit court’s decision is
REVERSED.
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur.
[1] Pursuant to a statutory modification of section 42-17-60 of the South Carolina Code (2010), injuries occurring on or after July 1, 2007, are appealed directly from the Commission to the Court of Appeals.
Feb 5, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, DUI & DWI, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
The following pending case below is a sad example of what can happen if you drink and drive. Serious injury can happen in an instant. In this case, she is left paralyzed from the waist down. This case is rather unique as it is the impaired driver herself who is suing. Certainly, there are several key defenses which will most probably end her case before it ever reaches a jury. Nevertheless, the facts highlight the need for bar owners and homeowners who serve alcolhol to be certain any customers or guests are of legal age and that they are safe to drive before leaving to get on the road. If these basis safety steps are not followed, then perhaps they should be held accountable. Tonight while enjoying the Super Bowl, please be aware of what can happen. Be Safe. Get Home.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
A South Carolina woman is suing the bar that served her alcohol as a minor the night she had a car accident that left her paralyzed.
Hess was 20 years old on Aug. 8, 2009 when she went to Jock’s Sports Grill in Beaumont, S.C. for a game of billiards, according to her lawsuit.
She alleged that she ordered an alcoholic drink at the bar and was served without being asked for identification. The legal drinking age in South Carolina is 21.
Hess accused the bar of several forms of negligence, including failure to “request and examine proof of identification,” serving alcohol to minors, and “failing to ascertain whether Plaintiff was impaired by the consumption of alcoholic beverages at the time Plaintiff purchased the alcoholic beverage.”
At about 1:05 a.m., Hess left the bar driving her own car and had a serious accident.
“The wheels of the motor vehicle Plaintiff was operating suddenly dropped off into a large unmaintained area on the shoulder of Alljoy Road, which caused Plaintiff to loose [sic] control of her vehicle and causing her to roll the vehicle over off the side of the road,” the lawsuit said.
As a result, Hess “suffered serious, permanently debilitating injuries causing the plaintiff to be paraplegic.” She blames the accident on the bar.
“The accident that resulted in Plaintiff being a paraplegic was due to and proximately caused by the negligence, recklessness, and willfulness and gross negligence of Defendant Jock’s Sports Grill,” the lawsuit said.
Attorneys representing the defendants deny “each and every allegation,” they each said in responses to the Hess’ lawsuit.
Their response lists eight possible ways Hess may have been negligent including driving while intoxicated, failing to keep her car under proper control, driving too fast for the conditions, and “failing to act in a reasonable and prudent manner.”
Feb 3, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
This recent SC Court of Appeals decision illustrates how small tactical moves at trial can make a real difference in the outcome. Trial skills and litigation experience matters. Better make sure your accident attorney actually goes to Court. You can always settle for less. You usually have to fight to get what you truly deserve.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Elizabeth Fettler, Appellant,
v.
Frederick Gentner, Respondent.
Appeal from Richland County
James R. Barber, III, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 4933
Heard November 17, 2011 – Filed January 25, 2012
Reversed and Remanded
Everett Hope Garner, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Ronald E. Alexander, of Columbia, for Respondent.
Lockemy, J.: In this civil action for negligence and damages as a result of a vehicular accident, Elizabeth Fettler argues the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the issue of Frederick Gentner’s negligence, and (2) presenting an erroneous and prejudicial charge to the jury as a result of the denial of her directed verdict motion. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On December 25, 2002, Fettler was a passenger in the vehicle her husband was driving on White Pond Road in Columbia, South Carolina. Gentner stated his vehicle was “probably ten car lengths” behind the Fettlers’ vehicle. Fettler testified that before her husband could proceed down an on ramp to the interstate, he had to yield at a yield sign to avoid an oncoming car turning left onto the on ramp. While at the yield sign, the Fettlers were rear-ended by Gentner. Gentner testified that while he saw the oncoming vehicle, it was in the distance at the time the Fettlers came to the yield sign. He stated he saw no reason for the Fettlers to stop at the yield sign because there was no vehicle in front of them. Gentner said after he saw the Fettlers come to the ramp, he stopped looking in the direction he was traveling. He specifically stated he “focused [his] attention no longer on [the Fettlers’ vehicle] but on the vehicle that was coming across.” Despite his actions, Gentner agreed he is required to look where he is going while driving a vehicle.
At the close of evidence, Fettler made a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of Gentner’s negligence. Gentner argued against the motion, stating Fettler’s husband did not have the right to stop his car in the road for no good reason, particularly at a yield sign. In discussing the motion, the trial court noted Gentner admitted to failing to keep a proper lookout and stated:
What he said is I quit paying attention as soon as those cars turned. I don’t know what they did; I didn’t see them again. I didn’t pay any attention until I saw this car stopped, and the guy that was driving that car stopped, and said he stopped it because he was yielding to the car, which he was required to do. And there was no testimony to the contrary. Your guy says I didn’t see anything, so we’re supposed to circumstantially say okay, there wasn’t anything there then?
However, the court eventually denied the motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Gentner. After the verdict was read, Fettler made a motion for a JNOV, contending the evidence allowed only one reasonable inference in favor of Fettler on the issues of negligence and proximate cause. The trial court treated the JNOV motion as a thirteenth juror motion, and stated there was evidence in the record to support the jury’s decision, and so it denied Fettler’s motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, this Court applies the same standard as the trial court.'” Pridgen v. Ward, 391 S.C. 238, 243, 705 S.E.2d 58, 61 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Gibson v. Bank of America, N.A., 383 S.C. 399, 405, 680 S.E.2d 778, 781 (Ct. App. 2009)). “‘The Court is required to view the evidence and inferences that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'” Id. (quoting Gibson, 383 S.C. at 405, 680 S.E.2d at 781). “‘The motions should be denied when the evidence yields more than one inference or its inference is in doubt.'” Id. (quoting Gibson, 383 S.C. at 405, 680 S.E.2d at 781). “‘An appellate court will only reverse the [trial] court’s ruling when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when the ruling is controlled by an error of law.'” Id. (quoting Gibson, 383 S.C. at 405, 680 S.E.2d at 781).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Directed Verdict and JNOV on the Issue of Defendant’s Negligence
Fettler contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict and JNOV because the evidence was not susceptible to more than one reasonable inference on the issue of Gentner’s negligence. We agree.
“A plaintiff, to establish a cause of action for negligence, must prove the following four elements: (1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) resulting in damages to the plaintiff; and (4) damages proximately resulted from the breach of duty.” Thomasko v. Poole, 349 S.C. 7, 11, 561 S.E.2d 597, 599 (2002) (citing Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 422, 529 S.E.2d 710, 712 (2000)). “[P]arties have a duty to keep a reasonable lookout to avoid hazards on the highway.” Id. at 12, 561 S.E.2d at 599. “In determining issues of negligence and contributory negligence arising out of collisions between vehicles proceeding in the same direction, [our supreme court has] held that a leading vehicle has no absolute legal position superior to that of one following.” Still v. Blake, 255 S.C. 95, 104, 177 S.E.2d 469, 473-74 (1970). “Each driver must exercise due care under the circumstances.” Id. at 104, 177 S.E.2d at 474. “As a general rule, the driver of the leading vehicle is required to make reasonable observations under the circumstances to determine that the particular movement of his vehicle, such as turning, slowing up, or stopping, can be made with safety to others, and to give adequate warning or signal of his intentions.” Id. “The driver of the following vehicle owes a reciprocal duty to keep his vehicle under reasonable control and not to follow too closely.” Id.
“‘Evidence of an independent negligent act of a third party is directed to the question of proximate cause.'” Manios v. Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, LLP, 389 S.C. 126, 142, 697 S.E.2d 644, 652 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Matthews v. Porter, 239 S.C. 620, 628, 124 S.E.2d 321, 325 (1962)). “‘The intervening negligence of a third person will not excuse the first wrongdoer if such intervention ought to have been foreseen in the exercise of due care. In such case, the original negligence still remains active, and a contributing cause of the injury.'” Id. at 142, 697 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 89, 502 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1998)). “Ordinarily, proximate cause is a question for the jury.” Id. (citing McKnight v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 385 S.C. 380, 387, 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ct. App. 2009).
Both Gentner and Gentner’s wife admit their failure to keep a lookout after the Fettlers reached the yield sign in front of the on ramp. The record reflects Gentner’s admissions:
Fettler’s counsel: After the Fettlers entered the ramp, you were looking at this [oncoming] vehicle and weren’t looking where you were going down that ramp?
Gentner: That’s correct, yes sir.
Fettler’s counsel: You weren’t looking? You weren’t looking where you were going?
Gentner: That’s correct.
Fettler’s counsel: That’s correct. Don’t you think you’re required to look where you’re going when you’re driving a vehicle?
Gentner: Yes, sir.
Gentner’s wife confirms Gentner’s admissions in the record, stating:
Fettler’s counsel: And you said you diverted your eyes somewhere and he diverted his eyes. Is that right?
Gentner’s wife: Yes.
Fettler’s counsel: So, both of you looked away from the lane of travel where you were headed. Is that right?
Gentner’s wife: Well, yes.
Fettler’s counsel: And subsequent to that, there was a car in front of you and it turned out to be the Fettlers, and y’all hit them in the rear. Is that correct?
Gentner’s wife: Yes.
Gentner argues there is evidence in the record supporting the inference that Fettler’s husband’s negligence caused or contributed to the accident by unnecessarily stopping at the yield sign. Thus, Gentner contends, there are conflicts of fact relating to his negligence to go to a jury. However, the only evidence supporting negligence on behalf of Fettler’s husband is Gentner’s personal testimony. Gentner testified he did not think there was any reason for the Fettlers to stop at the yield sign because the oncoming car that eventually turned left was not close enough to disturb the Fettlers’ travel. However, Fettler states there was an oncoming vehicle turning left onto the on ramp that they yielded for at the yield sign. Fettler’s husband claimed he yielded because the oncoming car was in the process of making its left-hand turn onto the on ramp. Taking into consideration Gentner himself testified he was “10 car lengths” behind the Fettlers, all parties agree there was a yield sign on the road before entering the interstate from the Gentners’ and Fettlers’ direction, and the Gentners both testified they took their eyes off the direction they were traveling, we find there was no evidence to provide a jury with any reasonable inference other than Gentner was negligent.
Gentner’s position that the Fettlers did not need to stop at the yield sign does not create an inference of negligence on Fettler’s husband’s part, it merely stands as a personal opinion from someone who did not have his eyes focused on his lane of travel. Thus, we reverse and remand the trial court’s denial of the Fettlers’ directed verdict and JNOV motions for a new trial in accordance with this decision.
II. Prejudicial Jury Charge
Fettler argues the trial court erred in presenting a prejudicial and erroneous charge to the jury. Specifically, Fettler contends the trial court erred in denying her directed verdict motion, resulting in an erroneous charge of negligence to the jury which was unsupported by the evidence. We agree, but as a threshold matter, we will first address preservation of the issue.
“An appellate court cannot address an issue unless first raised by appellant and ruled on by the trial judge.” Thomasko v. Poole, 349 S.C. 7, 10, 561 S.E.2d 597, 598 (2002) (citing Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 421, 529 S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000)). Once a party moves for a directed verdict on an issue, and that motion is denied, the party is not required to object again to the subsequent jury instruction regarding that issue. See id. at 10-11, 561 S.E.2d at 598-99; see also Carter v. Peace, 229 S.C. 346, 355, 93 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1956) (finding a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence had been refused; thus, the negligence instructions were correct under the trial court’s conception of the evidence and there was no duty upon appellant to object to the instruction because it would be futile and unnecessary). The issue is preserved. See Thomasko, 349 S.C. at 10-11, 561 S.E.2d at 598-99. “This [c]ourt does not require parties to engage in futile actions in order to preserve issues for appellate review.” Staubes, 339 S.C. at 415, 529 S.E.2d at 547.
While Fettler did not object to the jury instruction of negligence, she argued a motion for a directed verdict and JNOV.[1] on the issue of Gentner’s negligence and was denied. Therefore, we find the issue sufficiently preserved, and an objection to the jury charge of negligence would have been futile, as the trial court had already ruled there was evidence to go to the jury on the issue. We continue below to the merits of this argument.
“‘An appellate court will not reverse the trial court’s decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion.'” Berberich v. Jack, 392 S.C. 278, 285, 709 S.E.2d 607, 611 (2011) (quoting Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008)). “‘An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence.'” Id. (quoting Cole, 378 S.C. at 404, 663 S.E.2d at 33).
“‘A jury charge consisting of irrelevant and inapplicable principles may confuse the jury and constitutes reversible error where the jury’s confusion affects the outcome of the trial.'” Id. (quoting Cole, 378 S.C. at 404, 663 S.E.2d at 33). “An erroneous jury instruction will not result in reversal unless it causes prejudice to the appealing party.” Id. (citing Cole, 378 S.C. at 405, 663 S.E.2d at 33); see also Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 390, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000) (“When instructing the jury, the trial court is required to charge only principles of law that apply to the issues raised in the pleadings and developed by the evidence in support of those issues.”).
Because we find the issue of Gentner’s negligence should have been resolved by a directed verdict in Fettler’s favor, we also find there was no evidence in the record to support a charge of negligence to the jury. As the issue of Gentner’s negligence should have been decided as a matter of law, the irrelevant and inapplicable principles of negligence had the strong possibility of confusing the jury and affecting the outcome of the trial. We reverse and remand this issue to the trial court for a new trial in accordance with this decision.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision is
Reversed and Remanded.
Huff and Pieper, JJ., concur.
[1] As previously stated, the trial court viewed the motion for a JNOV as a thirteenth juror motion.
Jan 30, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
The article below reaffirms the real need for aggressive products liability lawyers. Yet again, a manufacturer has released a dangerous product into the market with serious flaws that are acknowledged only “after the fact.” There was already government oversight. And yet, children and their parents were still left unprotected. I am proud to be a plaintiff’s attorney who fights for those harmed by dangerous products. Despite all of the “tort reform” efforts by insurance carriers, personal injury lawyers willing to take cases to juries remain the best hope for those injured by the callous indifference of companies.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
The Colorful Hearts Teddy Bear has been recalled by Build-A-Bear Workshop because its plastic eyes can fall out, posing a choking hazard to children.
For the third time this year, Build-A-Bear Workshop has discovered a potentially dangerous defect in its toys.
The Overland-based toy retailer is recalling 297,200 “Colorful Hearts Teddy Bears” because the toy’s plastic eyes can fall out, posing a potential choking hazard to children.
The news also comes on the heels of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s announcement last week that Build-A-Bear agreed to pay a $600,000 penalty to settle allegations that it previously failed to report a dangerous defect involving its toy bear beach chair, which was eventually recalled in 2009. In that settlement, Build-A-Bear denied the commission’s allegations.
In this most recent recall, the colorful hearts bears — which were made in China — sold for $18 in stores and online from April of this year through this month. No injuries have been reported.
Jill Saunders, a company spokeswoman, wrote in an emailed statement that the bears passed an independent laboratory’s testing evaluation before being sold. But the company then observed that some production runs used ‘substandard fabric” that may tear around the bear’s eyes.
“We discovered the issue while doing ongoing quality and safety checks and immediately reported the issue to the CPSC and began the recall process,” she said. “That we have conducted three product recalls this year despite the fact that we have not received a single injury report related to any of those three products clearly demonstrates how seriously we take product safety.”
Patty Davis, a spokeswoman for the product safety commission, said Build-A-Bear reported the issue to the government this week.
“Any time a firm recalls a product, there is potential danger involved for consumers,” she said. “In this case, it involved young children, so we acted as quickly as possible.”
Consumers can return these bears to any Build-A-Bear store, where they will receive a coupon for any other available stuffed animal.
Ed Mierzwinski, consumer advocate for U.S. PIRG , the national association of state Public Interest Research Groups, said eyes falling off stuffed animals and dolls is a well-known problem that can lead to a choking hazard.
“Kids kiss their dolls,” he said. “Kids chew on their dolls. What’s going to fall off first is their eyes.”
Mierzwinski said he’s glad the company issued this recall — and that no injuries have been reported.
Still, he’s troubled by this year’s recalls and the penalty involving the 2009 recall.
“This company — its recent time line — gives me some concern that they really need to review their management and their risk analysis to make sure they are in compliance with the law to protect children,” Mierzwinski said.
RECENT RECALLS
Last month, Build-A-Bear and the commission announced a recall of a pink inflatable inner tube that poses a strangulation hazard if pulled over a small child’s head. The company said it had received one report of a 3-year-old girl pulling the inner tube over her head and having difficulty removing it. The inner tube is 9 inches in diameter.
The inner tube was part of a three-piece Fruit Tutu Bikini swimwear set for teddy bears. It was sold for $12.50 and was available in stores and online from April 2011 to August 2011. About 20,830 units were distributed.
And in August, Build-A-Bear recalled its “Love.Hugs.Peace” lapel pin because the paint on it contained an excessive level of lead. The company did so after initially defending the safety of the product when a California-based consumer health advocacy group raised concerns about it last year.
Besides three recalls in the past year, Build-A-Bear was accused of failing to report injuries from an item recalled in 2009. According to the product safety commission, the toy retailer learned of 10 reports of injury related to its toy bear beach chairs between July 2007 and January 2009. The toy beach chairs — about 260,000 of which were sold over a seven-year span — had sharp edges on their wooden folding frame that regulators said could pinch or even amputate a child’s fingertip.
But the company did not notify regulators of the incidents until two months before a recall was issued in 2009.
Under federal law, manufacturers and retailers are required to report to regulators within 24 hours upon receiving information that a product contains a defect that could create a substantial hazard or unreasonable risk of serious injury or death.
In its defense, Build-A-Bear said it did not have enough information at the time to conclude that the defects could create such a hazard or risk. So it does not believe it violated that reporting requirement.
“When Build-A-Bear Workshop had sufficient information … it promptly began working with CPSC in March of 2009 on the voluntary recall of the toy bear chair,” the retailer said in a statement.
This article was originally posted in the St. Louis Post Dispatch on December 24, 2011 by Kavita Kumar.
Jan 29, 2012 | Brain Injury/Head Trauma, Car Accidents, Personal Injury, Uncategorized, Wrongful Death
Safety Sphere Motorcycle Airbag Suit Turns You into a Giant Orange
December 17th, 2011by: Technabob
I’m one of those guys who thinks motorcycles are really cool, but I don’t ride one. I think it’s because I’ve always been convinced that I’d end up killing myself if I tried to negotiate the slick roads and maniac drivers of Chicago in the winter time. I actually knew a guy in college who rode a motorcycle and got in an accident and ended up as a paraplegic, so that doesn’t help with my anxieties.
But if I were to take up motorcycle riding, this would be protective gear which would convince me to ride.
Designed by Rejean Neron, the Safety Sphere is exactly what it sounds like. It’s a special bike suit that automatically inflates into a sphere, enveloping the rider and protecting them from injury if they ever go flying off the bike in a crash. The suit inflates to its full capacity in 5/100ths of a second, and fills with compressed air to cushion the impact. The sphere is made up of two layers of fabric, including an inner layer of thin elastic material, and an outer layer of parachute-type cloth. A battery connects to an electric ignition which triggers nitrocellulose canister, inflating the suit in the event of an impact.
Yes, the resulting expanded suit looks completely ridiculous. I’m reminded of that part ofWilly Wonka where Violet Beuregarde turns into a blueberry, except this time you’ll be turning into a navel orange. Still, I’d rather look stupid than end up dead. From the looks of things, you might still need some Oompa Loompas to come rescue you after an accident, too.
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This is one of those articles that may seem a little far fetched at first. However, given the seriousness of motorcycle injuries and the frequency of such accidents on our roadways, perhaps we should take another look. I like the bright orance safety suit. Afterall, just like with airbags in automobiles, you never want to actually need them. But, despite being as safe as possible, a serious motorcycle accident can occur in an instant because of another driver’s inattention or carelessness. This suit could very well become standard safety equipment for motorcyclists one day. We thank Technabob for introducing this cool technology that may be able to prevent serious injury or even death.
At Reeves, Aiken & Hightower, LLP, all of our attorneys are seasoned trial lawyers with over 70 years combined experience. Whether it is criminal or civil, our litigators are regularly in Court fighting for our clients. Two of our firm’s partners, Art Aiken and Robert Reeves, are inducted lifetime members of the Million Dollar Advocates Forum. Mr. Reeves has also been named one of the Top 100 lawyers for South Carolina in 2012 by the National Trial Lawyers Organization. Our attorneys include a former SC prosecutor, a former public defender, a former NC District Attorney intern, a former Registered Nurse (RN), and former insurance defense attorneys. As a result of their varied backgrounds, they collectively understand the criminal, insurance defense, and medical aspects of complex injury cases. We welcome an opportunity to sit down and personally review your case. Compare our attorneys’ credentials to any other law firm. Then call us today for a private consultation. www.rjrlaw.com
